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Abstract: The Music Modernization Act is reviewed in detail, with a particular eye toward the 
implications for members of the community supported by the National Recording Preservation Board, 
including librarians, archivists, and private collectors. The guide attempts an exhaustive treatment 
using plain but legally precise language. 
 
Acknowledgments: The author gratefully acknowledges the University of Colorado’s William A. 
Wise Law Library, and especially Professor Susan Nevelow Mart, for providing access to online 
research tools that made this project possible; Sam Brylawski for entrusting this project to him and 
patiently shepherding it through to completion; and the NRPB for commissioning the work. The 
author also wishes to thank Kevin Goldberg and Lauren Danzy, at the Digital Licensee Coordinator, 
as well as the following Library of Congress personnel for their assistance: Robin Dale, Caitlin Hunter, 
Steve Leggett, Gregory Lukow, Hope O’Keeffe, and David Pierce. The author thanks the U.S. 













Eric Harbeson worked in libraries for 30 years, including 10 years as music special collections librarian 
at the University of Colorado. He has been a vocal advocate for the copyright interests of libraries and 
archives and is a frequent writer and presenter on the subject. He holds master’s degrees in music 
(Cleveland State University) and Library and Information Science (University of Illinois). In addition 
to his writings on copyright, he is the editor of two critical music editions, both published by A-R 





© 2021 by Eric Harbeson 
This work is provided under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. To summarize, you are 
free to share, copy, and redistribute the material herein in any medium or format for noncommercial 
purposes, on condition that you credit the author and provide a direct link to the original source. 
Reasonable changes are permitted provided they are clearly indicated and do not suggest endorsement 
by the author or the National Recording Preservation Board. You may not use the work for any 
commercial purposes, nor may you distribute any derivatives made. All other rights are reserved. 
 
This document is intended for information purposes only.  It is not intended to be, and should not be 
construed as, legal advice. Readers should not undertake any decision, whether to act or to refrain 
from acting, based on information in this document.  Readers are urged to seek qualified legal counsel 
before undertaking any projects that implicate a legal matter. 
Table of Contents 
 
One-page summary ...................................................................................................................... v 
Overview of the MMA: Introduction and background ............................................................. 1 
I. Music Modernization............................................................................................................... 5 
II. Classics Protection and Access 
Background ............................................................................................................................. 11 
Overview of provisions .......................................................................................................... 17 
A. Protection of pre-1972 sound recordings ...................................................................... 17 
1. Scope of protection ............................................................................................. 17 
2. Limitations on scope ........................................................................................... 17 
B. Length of protection ........................................................................................................ 19 
C. Limitations on protection ................................................................................................ 21 
1. Exceptions included ............................................................................................ 21 
2. Exceptions not included ..................................................................................... 27 
D. The “Last 20 Years” rule, expanded ............................................................................... 29 
E. Filing requirement and licensing ..................................................................................... 31 
1. Filing with the Copyright Office ........................................................................ 31 
2. Statutory licensing ............................................................................................... 31 
F. Noncommercial use of dormant recordings .................................................................. 33 
1. Statutory requirements ........................................................................................ 33 
2. Copyright Office regulation ............................................................................... 34 
G. Additional considerations ................................................................................................ 43 
1. Quasi-copyright ................................................................................................... 43 
2. Relationship to state laws ................................................................................... 44 
3. Pre-1972 recordings made outside the United States....................................... 45 
4. Sovereign immunity ............................................................................................ 47 
5. Criminal infringement ......................................................................................... 48 
6. Bootleg recordings .............................................................................................. 49 
III: Allocation for Music Performers ...................................................................................... 51 
IV. Case study: Institutional sound recordings ................................................................... 53 
Glossary......................................................................................................................................... 59 
Resources ..................................................................................................................................... 64 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 65 
Appendix 
A. Selected statutory texts 
a. Sec. 107 (fair use) ................................................................................................ 69 
b. Sec. 108 (reproduction by libraries and archives) ............................................. 69 
c. Sec. 301 (Preemption with respect to other laws) ............................................ 72 
d. Sec. 1401 (Unauthorized use of pre-1972 sound recordings ........................... 72 
B. Noncommercial uses decision tree (Sec. 1401(c)) ......................................................... 81 





The Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act “MMA” is divided into three “titles” 
 
Title I: The Musical Works Modernization Act (“MWMA”) 
Title II: The Classics Protection and Access Act (“CPAA”) 
Title III: The Allocations for Music Producers (“AMP”) Act 
 
For purposes of this document, Titles I and II are most important. 
 
Title I: Music Licensing Modernization 
• Creates a blanket compulsory license for interactive digital delivery of musical works by digital 
music providers. 
• Royalties are paid at a statutory rate, based on revenue and usage. 
• Requires payment of an annual assessment fee. 
 
Title II: Classics Protection and Access 
• Creates federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, pre-empting state provisions and 
bringing a more unified protection regime.  
• Protection for some pre-1972 now expires before 2067:  
 
Date Published Term of protection Expires 
Before Jan. 1, 1923 3 years after enactment Jan. 1, 2022 
Jan. 1, 1923 – Dec. 31, 1946 Transition period + 5 years 100 years after publication 
Jan. 1, 1947 – Dec. 31, 1956 Transition period + 15 years 110 years after publication 
Jan. 1, 1957 – Feb. 14, 1972 Through Sec. 301(c) expiration Feb. 15, 2067 
 
• Uses of pre-1972 recordings are now subject to important limitations and exceptions: Sections 
107 (fair use), 108 (libraries and archives), 109 (distribution after first sale), and 110 (teaching and 
performing). 
• A new provision allows for non-commercial use of pre-1972 recordings that are not being 
commercially exploited, after a good faith search and 90 days after notice is filed with the 
Copyright Office, provided the rights holder does file a notice opting out. 
• Libraries and archives have broad license to reproduce, distribute, and perform, pre-1972 
recordings not being commercially exploited, under the provisions of section 108(h). 
• Attempts to remove sovereign immunity, probably unsuccessfully. 
• State laws are (mostly) preempted 
 
Title III: Allocation for Music Producers 
• Allows for royalty payments from statutory licenses to producers, recording engineers, and mixers 





The Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (“MMA”)1 is the most significant change 
to U.S. copyright law in two decades. The result of many years of work building up to the legislation, 
including two major studies by the United States Copyright Office, the MMA aimed to update the 
copyright law with respect to three music-specific issues: licensing of musical works for digital delivery 
in interactive systems; protection of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972; and payment 
of royalties to sound recordings producers, mixers, and recording engineers. 
 
The Act had a remarkable path to passage. Originally three separate bills, each introduced in 2017, the 
Act gained sudden and dramatic momentum after the third of the three—the hundred-page Music 
Modernization Act (H.R. 4706)—was introduced just prior to the adjournment of the 115th Congress’s 
first session.2 The voluminous nature of the bill virtually guaranteed a level of attention that previously-
introduced copyright legislation had not received in many years.3 Very shortly after the introduction 
of H.R. 4706, a deftly-timed op-ed in the Washington Post by original Four Tops member Duke Fakir 
brought national attention to the issue of pre-1972 recordings.4 By April 10, 2018, the original Music 
Modernization Act had been re-written to include two additional bills: the CLASSICS Act5 (H.R. 
3301), and the AMP Act6 (H.R. 881). The new bill, introduced as H.R. 5447, moved rapidly through 
the House of Representatives, passing unanimously—415–0 on a roll call vote—on April 25, 2018. 
Meanwhile, individual versions of each of the three bills had been introduced in the Senate in late 
January.  
 
In May, shortly after the committee held hearings on each of the bills, the legislation encountered its 
first obstacle. At issue was the treatment of sound recordings created prior to February 15, 1972. The 
CLASSICS Act federalized protection for “pre-1972 recordings,” which were previously governed 
only by state laws, by creating a new exclusive right to digital public performance equivalent to that 
already bestowed on recordings since that date. However, by limiting itself to the creation of a new 
digital performance right, and thus leaving in place the state laws governing all other exclusive rights, 
Congress ignored the very issue that gave rise to the debate over pre-1972 recordings debate more 
than a decade earlier.  
 
Public interest advocacy groups had for many years voiced concerns that the state law system was 
threatening efforts to preserve America’s recorded heritage—that the vague and inconsistent 
treatment of recordings by the various state laws, and especially with respect to the limitations and 
exceptions, made effective curation of recordings collections needlessly difficult or impossible. It was 
 
1 For purposes of this document, “Music Modernization Act” and “MMA” refer to the entire act, not just to Title I (which 
originally shared that name, but which is now called the “Musical Works Modernization Act”). 
2 https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr4706/BILLS-115hr4706ih.pdf  
3 In addition to the MMA, the 115th Congress alone had introduced, but not acted upon: H.R.3350 (Transparency in Music 
Licensing and Ownership Act); H.R.3301 (CLASSICS Act); H.R.1914 (PROMOTE Act of 2017); H.R.1836 (Fair Play Fair 
Pay Act of 2017); and H.R.881 (Allocation for Music Producers Act). 
4 Fakir, Duke. “Opinion | We’re Ripping off Some of the Best Musicians of the Last Century. It Needs to Stop.” 
Washington Post, December 28, 2017, sec. Opinions. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-ripping-off-
some-of-the-best-musicians-of-the-last-century-it-needs-to-stop/2017/12/28/5c24b660-ea53-11e7-b698-
91d4e35920a3_story.html  
5 CLASSICS is an acronym for “Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs Service and Important Contributions to 
Society.” 
6 AMP is an acronym for “Allocations for Music Producers.” 
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those concerns that provided the impetus for the U.S. Copyright Office’s 2011 study of pre-1972 
sound recordings.7 The Office’s final report from the study recommended bringing sound recordings 
fully under Federal law, and the subsequent National Recording Preservation Plan extensively discussed 
the urgency with which such a solution was needed.8 Despite this, the authors of the CLASSICS Act 
elected to preserve the status quo, placing a bandage over the existing system rather than addressing 
the flaws in the system itself. 
 
In addition to the general problem of only partially addressing the problem of the patchwork of state 
laws (and thus, in all likelihood, leaving the problem to fester for at least another decade), the 
legislation failed to provide meaningful exceptions to the protection of pre-1972 recordings. The bill 
applied the fair use (Sec. 1079) and library and archives (Sec. 108) exceptions, but only to claims of 
infringement over the new digital performance right. For all other uses, including nearly all of the uses 
made by sound recordings curators, the various state laws would still govern what was permissible. 
 
Even considering just the digital performance right at the center of the bill, the exceptions provided 
were inadequate. Absent from the bill was any application of the one section—Sec. 110—that provides 
copyright exceptions for public performances. In particular, the bill failed to allow for public 
performances in classrooms and online educational settings, as provided for by Secs. 110(1) and 
110(2), respectively. The conspicuous absence of any public performance exceptions in a bill that was 
exclusively concerned with the public performance right was complemented by the inclusion of the 
Sec. 108 library and archives exceptions, which was bizarre only in that the latter does not apply to 
public performances at all.10 The presence of Sec. 108 exceptions in the bill was meaningless, since 
there would have been no possible scenario in which they could have been applied. 
 
The bill also failed to establish any meaningful limitations on the duration of protection. One of the 
loudest complaints raised by public interest groups over the previous twenty years was that the reliance 
on state laws created a functionally perpetual copyright over pre-1972 sound recordings. At that time, 
the law dictated that state protection of pre-1972 recordings would cease on February 15, 2067, with 
the result that some of the oldest recordings would have been protected for close to two centuries by 
the time their terms expired.11 A high priority for public interest groups was the creation of a public 
domain for sound recordings. 
 
In response to these and other concerns, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced the ACCESS12 to 
Recordings Act (S. 2933), in direct competition with the CLASSICS Act. In contrast to the latter’s 
bulky creation of a quasi-copyright with limited federal protection, the ACCESS to Recordings Act 
would have brought pre-1972 sound recordings fully under federal copyright law. 
 
7 U.S. Copyright Office. Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: A report of the Register of Copyrights. Dec. 2011. 
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf  
8 The Library of Congress National Recording Preservation Plan (Council on Library and Information Resources and the Library 
of Congress, 2012). https://clir.wordpress.clir.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/pub156.pdf  
9 This document follows the convention of referring to copyright statutes by the place they occupy in the U.S. Code, Title 
17, unless otherwise specified. Thus, “Sec. 107” is shorthand for 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
10 The exception is Sec. 108(h), which provides exceptions to copyright in works in the last 20 years of their copyright 
term. Even in this case, though, the exception could not have been applied because the recordings were still not subject 
to federal copyright. 
11 For comparison, despite various term extensions, George M. Cohan’s 1917 song, Over There, entered the public domain 
at the end of 1992, 75 years after it was published, but Nora Bayes’s recording of the song from the same year would have 
been protected until 2067, for a total of 150 years. 
12 ACCESS is an acronym for “Accessibility for Curators, Creators, Educators, Scholars, and Society.” 
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The summer of 2018 saw intense negotiations from different stakeholders. As the session moved 
toward adjournment, mounting pressure to pass a bill led to several compromise amendments. With 
time running short, Congress finally passed the amended bill through an unusual parliamentary 
maneuver known as an “engrossed amendment:” a bill that had already passed—the engrossed bill—
was amended by replacing it in its entirety with the MMA.13 This required a unanimous vote in both 
houses, which, in what must be a first for a major piece of copyright legislation, the bill won. 
 
The final version as enacted into law reflects the time-enforced desperation that gave birth to it. Title 
II of the Act—originally the CLASSICS Act—is contains many compromises and is often clumsy, but 
it also brings major improvements for people working with sound recordings collections.  
 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the new law from the perspective of public interest groups is 
the provisions—also a result of the time pressure—that they had not initially sought. These include 
an unexpectedly broad application of one of the most important library exceptions, Sec. 108(h), and 
a new safe harbor provision for noncommercial use of pre-1972 recordings (which was added only 
days before passage), all in addition to providing essentially everything that the public interest groups 
had requested. For the sound recordings collection community, the MMA was a rare, and near total 
win. 
 
The Act is also interesting for one element that it does not contain. Sound recordings continue to be 
subject to the exclusive right of public performance only in a digital context. An AM or FM radio 
station must, for example, license each copyrighted musical work that it performs, but it need not 
license the performance of the sound recording. Advocates for sound recording rights holders have 
long sought parity with musical works in the form of an analog performance right, and digital 
performance platforms have also pressed to level their competitive playing field with traditional radio. 
However, though legislation was introduced to extend the full public performance right to sound 
recordings, Congress declined to include it in the MMA, leaving that question for another day.14 
 
This document explores the implications of the Music Modernization Act for librarians, archivists, 
and other curators, scholars, and users of sound recordings. Title I of the Act, the Musical Works 
Modernization Act, addresses licensing and digital delivery of musical works. Though Title I forms by 
far the bulk of the MMA in terms of length, Title II—the Classics Protection and Access Act—is 
easily the most important section of the MMA for the present purposes and that discussion forms the 
bulk of this document. After a short discussion of Title III, the Allocation for Music Producers Act, 
the new legislation is considered in its entirety in the form of a case study.
 
13 In this case, Congress amended H.R. 1551, a bill originally designated “To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
to modify the credit for production from advanced nuclear power facilities,” by replacing its text with the text of the 
MMA. See the amendment text, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1551/text/eas 
14 H.R. 5219, the Ask Musicians For Music (AM FM) Act, was introduced in the House in November of 2019. It garnered 
no cosponsors. A competing resolution arguing against a radio performance royalty, H.Con.Res.20, was introduced in 
February 2019 and gained 227 cosponsors.  Neither was acted upon by the 116th Congress. 
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The Musical Works Modernization Act (“MWMA”), Title I of the Music Modernization Act (MMA), 
establishes a new mechanism for licensing musical works in a digital context. In its 51 pages of new 
law—the MWMA constitutes roughly three quarters of the text of the MMA—the Act provides for a 
blanket license to make and distribute digital sound recordings of non-dramatic musical works through 
interactive streams and limited and permanent downloads.16  
 
The new license has three important features. First, it is a compulsory license, meaning that the owner of 
the copyright does not have the ability to deny the licensing of the work. Rather, the licensee may 
obtain the license without permission, by paying royalties at a rate set either by statute or by an entity 
charged with rate setting. Second, it is a blanket license—instead of requiring multiple individual 
licenses on a work-by-work basis, the MWMA allows prospective licensees to obtain a single license 
that includes all works covered by the statute. Finally, and relatedly, the license is available whether or 
not the rights holder can be found. The MWMA is thus the United States’ first foray into extended 
collective licensing, creating some relief for the problem of orphan works, at least in a musical setting. 
 
The license is available to digital music providers. To qualify as a digital music provider (hereafter, 
“DMP”), the person or entity must satisfy three criteria: (1) a direct contractual relationship with the 
end user of the service provided, (2) the ability to fully report on any revenue generated by the service, 
and (3) the ability to report on any and all usage of sound recordings and musical works provided by 
the service. Any DMP should be able to obtain the new blanket license. 
 
Much of the text of the MWMA is concerned with establishing, and providing for, the infrastructure 
to administer the blanket licenses, for which Congress provided two years of lead time. The Act 
establishes two new entities: a Mechanical Licensing Collective (“MLC”) and a Digital Licensee 
Coordinator (“DLC”). Among other things, the MLC is charged with issuing licenses, collecting and 
distributing royalties, enforcing the terms of the license. The MWMA also requires the Mechanical 
Licensing Collective to establish a publicly searchable database of rights holder information. The 
Digital Licensee Coordinator coordinates the licensees’ activities, including representing licensees’ 
interests in rate-setting hearings. 
  
 
15 This name comes from the short title, Title I, Sec. 101 (132 Stat. 3676): “Short Title. This title may be cited as the 
‘Musical Works Modernization Act.’” However, the Title itself is called “Title I—Music Licensing Modernization.” This 
is presumably the reason that some sources refer to the title as the “Music Licensing Modernization Act.” 
16 U.S. Copyright Office. https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/115/  
• Creates a blanket license for interactive digital delivery of recordings of musical works. 
• License to use non-dramatic musical works only. 
• License became available starting January 1, 2021. 
• Rates to be based on “willing buyer/seller” rather than policy-based rates. 
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Sound recordings and underlying works 
A crucial concept at play throughout the MMA is the notion that sound recordings normally embody 
at least two copyrightable works. Copyright in the sound recording itself applies only to the sounds 
that were fixed in the recording process. Those sounds may also embody a performance of another 
copyrightable work, most often a musical work. The presence of a copyrighted musical work on a 
sound recording means that any use of the sound recording implicates two different sets of copyrights. 
Use of a copyrighted sound recording containing a copyrighted musical work thus requires the user 
to clear each of those copyrights.17  The MWMA provides a mechanism only for licensing the 
underlying musical work.18 
 
The compulsory license 
Mechanical rights—the exclusive right to fix a musical work in the form of a sound recording (or 
mechanical reproduction)—were first added to U.S. law in the Copyright Act of 1909.19 In creating 
the new exclusive right, Congress also limited that right by creating, for the first time, a statutory 
requirement to license mechanical reproductions. That compulsory mechanical license was included 
in Section 115 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 
Unlike statutory exceptions to copyright, under which a work may be used freely without infringing 
copyright, the compulsory license system limited rights holders’ ability to deny permission without 
limiting their ability to collect royalties from use of their works. The compulsory license allows the 
licensee to make and distribute recordings of the musical work as both physical and digital 
phonorecords (the latter are termed digital phonorecord deliveries, or “DPDs”). It also grants the 
licensee a limited right to create arrangements of the work for the purposes of making the recording. 
The law provides a statutory royalty rate that is periodically reviewed and adjusted by a Copyright 
Royalty Board, which consists of three judges appointed by the Librarian of Congress. 
 
Generally speaking, in order to obtain the Sec. 115 license, the musical work to be licensed must 
already have been distributed to the public at least once as a sound recording (either in physical or 
digital form) under the authority of the owner of the work’s copyright—Sec. 115 does not authorize 
the first recording of a work. The Sec. 115 license also does not license the use of existing sound 
recordings; it only applies to the underlying musical works. 
 
The blanket license 
In its essence, the MWMA makes a fairly simple change: it provides a way for services to deliver music 
to their users digitally through a single license. Prior to the MMA, compulsory licenses for both 
physical and digital deliveries could be obtained only on a work-by-work basis, meaning that a provider 
that wished to license fifty musical works needed to go through the licensing process fifty separate 
times. Under the MWMA, the same service need only acquire a single license, called a Blanket License 
for Digital Use. The blanket license authorizes the use of all eligible works, even if the copyright owner 
cannot be found. The license applies only to digital delivery—the mechanical licensing process for 
 
17 For example, a documentary filmmaker’s use of a recording of John Lennon performing his song, Imagine, caused the 
filmmaker to be sued twice by different rights holders: once for infringement of the musical work, Lennon v. Premise Media 
Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), and once for use of the sound recording, EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media 
Corp. L.P., 2008 NY Slip Op 33157(U), 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8213 (Sup. Ct. New York County). 
18 Title II of the Act, the Classics Protection and Access Act, discussed below, addresses copyrighted sound recordings. 
19 Copyright and the Music Marketplace: a report of the Register of Copyrights (February 2015), 17. 
 7 
delivery on physical media, such as distribution on compact discs, remains unchanged and still requires 
a separate license for each individual work. 
 
The blanket license became available on January 1, 2021.20 As of that date, Digital Music Providers 
can obtain the license by filing a Notice of License (“NOL”) with the Music Licensing Collective.21 
Also on that date, the BDL replaced any existing compulsory licenses for digital delivery obtained 
under the old system.22 
 
In addition to meeting the eligibility requirements for the compulsory license, the MWMA places 
additional requirements on DMPs. The provider must, for example, be able to supply the MLC with 
a description of its planned (or existing) activities, demonstrating that it meets the criteria for obtaining 
the DMP. This includes the ability to provide accurate regular reports of user activity, including works 
performed.23 The DMP will be expected to make monthly payments and reports. The DMP must also 
report any significant mechanical licensing activity that it undertakes outside the scope of the blanket 
license (such as voluntary direct licenses). 
 
The blanket license was created primarily with major commercial digital music providers (e.g., Spotify, 
Amazon Music, etc.) in mind, both to facilitate the provision of services and to create better 
accountability and, ultimately, provide increased revenue to rights holders. However, the license also 
provides a potential benefit to sound recordings collections seeking to undertake significant digital 
scholarship projects, digitization and preservation programs, and other internal and grant-funded 
programs that envision digital delivery of musical works. The blanket license streamlines the 
permissions process, allowing additional certainty in the rights review process. 
 
Costs of the license 
The MWMA is a powerful solution to a problem that many institutions have faced, but it is not free. 
The license requires royalty payments for each performance of each copyrighted work. In addition, 
the obtaining the license will require investment in the additional time and technology required to 
meet the requirements of becoming a DMP.  Finally, the license requires payment of an annual 
administrative assessment, which helps defray the costs of operating the Music Licensing Collective.  
The system benefits libraries and archives, by allowing them to make archival recordings available, and 
also copyright holders, by facilitating additional licensing revenue. 
 
Providing access to historic recordings has traditionally been complicated by the legal challenges 
relating to copyright in underlying musical works. Though in the past a fair use theory might have 
been plausible with respect to performance of sound recordings, licensing was probably still required 
 
20 The MWMA directs the U.S. Copyright Office and the two new entities—the MLC and DLC—to determine many of 
the details. The Office recently published two interim rules, both effective October 19, 2020. The first governs notices of 
license and non-blanket activity, data collection and delivery, and reporting of payment and usage. 85 Federal Register 58114 
(Sept. 17, 2020). The second covers the MLC’s reporting and distribution of payments to rights holders. Id at 58160 (Sept. 
17, 2020). As of this writing, the office has several rulemaking proceedings open, which include questions of confidentiality 
requirements of the MLC and DLC (Docket 2020-7), the musical works database (Doc. 2020-8), and cumulative reporting 
and transfer of royalties to the MLC (Doc. 2020-12). None of these is within the scope of this document. 
21 Prior to that date, Digital Music Providers may follow a process that involves filing a Notice of Intent (“NOI”) with the 
Copyright Office and following their prescribed forms and rules. 
22 During the next rate proceeding for the section 115 license, the Copyright Royalty Board will apply a market-based 
willing buyer / willing seller standard, replacing the previous section 801(b)(1) policy-oriented rate-setting standard. 
23 The Copyright Office has issued an interim rule, which became effective October 19, 2020. 85 Federal Register 58160 
(Sept. 17, 2020). 
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for the underlying musical work. However, prior to the MWMA, licensing of musical works had to be 
done on a work-by-work basis.  Because collections in question might occupy thousands of linear feet, 
with each foot representing several hours of audio, few if any institutions had the wherewithal to 
obtain individual licenses for each recording they might wish to stream. The blanket license appears 
to be a solution to what has been an intractable problem.  
 
To take advantage of this solution, libraries and archives will need to be able to meet the criteria for 
becoming a DMP. This includes reporting requirements that many institutions may not be accustomed 
to providing.  To be able to meet this requirement, institutions may need to acquire or develop 
software to facilitate the reporting and to find personnel hours to ensure the reporting requirements 
are met. 
 
The cost of the license starts with the cost of the royalties.  Each time a copyrighted musical work is 
streamed, the DMP must pay a royalty, and the amount of that royalty is determined by the Copyright 
Royalty Board (CRB).  Determining the royalty rates is a complex process and will depend on the 
particulars of the institution and other factors.  That determination is beyond the scope of this 
document.24 The rate is under discussion and may change in the near future.25 
 
In addition to royalty payments, use of the blanket license requires DMPs to pay an annual 
“administrative assessment.” The MWMA provides for the funding of the MLC through a number of 
different means. Among those, the Act provides that the MLC will be funded by an administrative 
assessment, which will be paid for, in large part, by digital music providers.26 The amount of the 
assessment is determined by the CRB, which is charged with determining an amount that is “calculated 
to defray the reasonable … costs.”27  The cost, for most institutions, is based on the number of unique 
sound recordings used in a given month.28 As of this writing, the costs are: 
 








> 100,000 $60,000 
 
The Sec. 115 blanket license may not be the solution many institutions hoped for, and it may not 
present a workable solution for some institutions. Certainly, it doesn’t create an exception to copyright 
that would allow libraries and archives to provide access at no cost, and the license requires more 
 
24 Specifics may be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, 37 CFR 385. 
25 Music Licensing Consortium, “Announcement Concerning Interim Mechanical Royalty Rates Pending the Outcome 
of Copyright Royalty Board Remand Proceedings in Phonorecords III.” 13 January 2021.  
https://www.themlc.com/press/announcement-concerning-interim-mechanical-royalty-rates-pending-outcome-
copyright-royalty  
26 17 U.S.C. 115(d)(7)(A). 
27 17 U.S.C. 115(d)(7)(D)(ii) 
28 “Joint motion to modify the terms of implementation of the initial administrative assessment,” U.S. Copyright Royalty 




work and personnel than an exception would have. Still, the blanket license at least provides a solution 
for institutions that have the funding and infrastructure to take advantage of it. One might hope that, 
as time progresses and institutions gain more experience working within this structure, consortial 
arrangements may also be developed, allowing an even greater number of participants.
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Title II of the MMA, the Classics Protection and Access Act (“CPAA”), addresses the problem of the 
so-called “pre-1972 sound recordings.” 30 The Act mostly succeeds, if inelegantly, in solving the key 
problems, though it leaves some confusion and new questions in its wake and it also fails to address 
some important issues. 
 
Sound recordings did not receive federal copyright protection until 1972, at least 115 years after the 
first sound recording was created.31 Though the 1909 copyright revision did include a royalty 
requirement for “mechanical reproduction” of a musical work—and indeed that was one of the 
driving motivations behind the revision—the law did not yet recognize sound recordings as being 
works independent of the musical works they embody. However, though the copyright law clearly did 
not reach the sound recording as an independent work, it was unclear how and whether the law did 
reach the sound recording.  
 
For much of the early twentieth century, there was fierce debate over how to handle sound recordings. 
Parties argued in court over issues such as whether recordings were musical works, and if so whether 
the release of a recording constituted publication of that work. They argued whether recordings 
 
30 For purposes of this document, unless otherwise specified, the term, “pre-1972 sound recording” refers only to domestic 
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. Recordings of foreign origin that were subject to restoration under the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act fall in a grey area and in some cases the CPAA may not apply. For more information, see the treatment 
of restored recordings, sec. II.G.3, below (page 45). 
31 Patrick Feaster. “Enigmatic Proofs: The archiving of Édouard-Léon Scott de Martinville’s phonautograms. Technology 
and Culture 60/2supp (April, 2019), S14–S38, S15. “To prove he had originated the principle of recording sound 
vibrations…, Scott invoked a venerable archival convention established with precisely such scenarios in mind. On 26 
January 1857, he had already deposited a pli cachet with the Académie: a sealed envelope containing evidence of his ideas 
and accomplishments as of that date.” 
• New federal oversight of pre-1972 recordings 
• Protection for pre-1972 recordings expires in phases based on publication date: 
 
Date Published Term of protection Expires 
Before Jan. 1, 1923 3 years after enactment Jan. 1, 2022 
Jan. 1, 1923 – Dec. 31, 1946 Transition period + 5 years 100 years after publication 
Jan. 1, 1947 – Dec. 31, 1956 Transition period + 15 years 110 years after publication 
Jan. 1, 1957 – Feb. 14, 1972 Through Sec. 301(c) expiration Feb. 15, 2067 
 
• Use of pre-1972 recordings subject to fair use as well as other exceptions.  
• “Last 20 years rule” applies to all pre-1972 recordings 
• Filing requirement to obtain statutory damages and attorney’s fees 
• New safe harbor for noncommercial use of pre-1972 recordings 
• State laws preempted, but not fully replaced 
• No sovereign immunity—perhaps 
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constituted “writings” for purposes of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.32 If they were “writings,” 
did Congress decline to protect sound recordings (thus making them unprotectable)? Or were sound 
recordings not “writings” at all, and therefore outside the scope of Congress’s copyright authority 
entirely? The common law (i.e., law created by courts through judicial tradition and precedent) 
protected unpublished writings, and states had the power to codify those laws; were sound recordings 
protected by the common law as well? If so, was that protection divested once they were published, 
as was the case with unpublished writings?33 
 
The Sound Recording Act of 1971 amended the 1909 Copyright Act to add, for the first time, federal 
copyright protection for sound recordings, beginning on February 15, 1972.34 However, that Act 
specified that the new protection was prospective only: recordings fixed prior to that date were 
unaffected and remained outside the scope of federal copyright.35 Shortly after, in Goldstein v. California, 
the Supreme Court upheld states’ authority to protect sound recordings by statute or common law.36 
The result was that protection of copyrighted sound recordings (i.e., recordings subject to the Sound 
Recording Act), was unified and formalized, while protection of earlier recordings was left to the 
states, each to act in their own manner. 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976, which came into force January 1, 1978, superseded the 1909 Copyright 
Act. Among the sweeping changes it brought, the new law fully preempted state level protection of 
any writings, including unpublished works. Congress made one exception, though, by leaving in place 
the state protection of pre-1972 sound recordings. Section 301(c) of the new law stated that rights to 
sound recordings “under the common law or statutes of any State” were preserved until February 15, 
2047.37 That date was later revised to 2067 when Congress extended the general term of copyright.38 
 
In addition to the common law, most states provided protection for pre-1972 sound recordings in the 
form of criminal statutes.39 Though states borrowed language from one another, there was little 
uniformity from state to state. Pronounced differences included the length of protection (some states 
 
32 U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 8. 
33 For extensive treatment of the peculiar history of sound recordings copyright in the United States, see Bruce Epperson, 
“From The Statute of Anne To Z.Z. Top: The Strange World of American Sound Recordings, How it Came About, And 
Why it Will Never Go Away,” J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 15/1 (2015). 
34 An Act to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of 
protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recording, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (enacted 
October. 15, 1971). Contemporary writings referred to the law as the Sound Recording Act, and that convention will be 
followed here. See Melvin L. Halpern, “Sound Recording Act of 1971: An end to piracy on the high C’s.” George Washington 
Law Review 40/5 (July 1972), 964–994.  
35 Id at Sec. 3, “The provisions…of this Act shall apply only to sound recordings fixed, published, and copyrighted on and 
after the effective date of this Act and before January 1, 1975, and nothing in…this Act shall be applied retroactively or 
construed as affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before the effective date of this Act.” 
The sunset provision was removed in 1974 by Pub. L. 93-573 (88 Stat. 1873). See 1 Patry on Copyright § 1:70. 
36 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
37 An Act for the general revisions of the Copyright Law, title 17 of the United States Code, and for other purposes. Pub. L. 94-553, 90 
Stat. 2541. 
38 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. Pub L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. 
39 California was and is unique for having adopted both civil and criminal statutes governing pre-1972 recordings. Cal. Civ. 
Code § 980. Indiana and Vermont do not have any current statutes related to pre-1972 recordings. See “State Criminal 
Laws: Pre-1972 Sound Recordings,” prepared by the U.S. Copyright Office based on a 50-state survey by the Association 
of Research Libraries. 
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/20111212_survey_state_criminal_laws_ARL_CO_v2.pdf 
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extended protection for all recordings to 2067, while others provided very limited terms),40 the scope 
of protection, and determination of ownership. In particular, the scope and nature of any limitations 
and exceptions varied significantly. Some states included exceptions for libraries and archives, or 
noncommercial uses, or both, while a few states had no exceptions at all (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Exceptions for library and noncommercial activity by state41 
 
For librarians, archivists, and others charged with preserving historic sound recordings, the lack of 
consistent federal law governing pre-1972 sound recordings created significant obstacles. These 
obstacles were discussed extensively in the National Recording Preservation Board’s report, The State 
of Recorded Sound Preservation in the United States: A National Legacy at Risk in the Digital Age.42 Published 
in 2010, the report found that the legal landscape compounded an already daunting situation by 
rendering virtually all preservation work on pre-1972 sound recordings illegal, strictly speaking. Even 
where institutions were comfortable operating in legal grey area, preservation of pre-1972 recordings 
presented enormous technical and logistical challenges. Meeting those challenges requires funding, 
but the uncertain legal basis put projects involving pre-1972 sound recordings at a competitive 
disadvantage for public grants. In addition, public institutions’ inability to legally provide access to 
pre-1972 recordings created a disincentive for private collectors to deposit their collections. The result 
was that some unknown millions of pre-1972 recordings were at risk of disappearing irrevocably. 
 
 
40 The state of Colorado had the shortest term, limiting all protection to fifty-six years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-601 (1.5). 
Colorado is also the only state that referred to its protection as “copyright.” 
41 “State Criminal Laws, pre-1972 Sound Recordings,” supra. 
42 National Recording Preservation Board, The State of Recorded Sound Preservation In The United States: A National Legacy At 










At the urging of the Association for Sound Recordings Collections and other parties, the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 2009 instructed the U.S. Copyright Office to study the question of bringing 
pre-1972 sound recordings under federal law.43 The Office released its report in December, 2011, 
recommending that pre-1972 recordings be federalized.44 The following year, another congressionally-
mandated report, the National Recordings Preservation Plan (NRPP), similarly recommended full 
federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings.  
 
The reports differed somewhat in their recommendation for how federalization should be achieved, 
especially in the question the length of protection. The Copyright Office recommended, among other 
things, that pre-1923 recordings enter the public domain immediately, and that later recordings be 
assigned a term of 95 years from publication, or 120 years from fixation in the case of unpublished 
recordings. In addition, the Office recommended offering additional protection until 2067 for post-
1923 recordings that are made available to the public, as an incentive to rights holders to release those 
recordings. The National Recording Preservation Plan recommended “a flat 95-year term for both 
published and unpublished pre-1972 recordings.” In response to the Office’s recommended incentive, 
the NRPP indicated that the incentive should be available only for releases that are made available in 
a high-quality physical format and without unduly restrictive licensing.  
 
Though sound recordings protection at the state level remained mostly static, the federal statute had 
evolved with the rest of copyright law. The most consequential change came in 1996 with the passage 
of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).45 Prior to this act, owners of 
sound recordings copyrights did not possess an exclusive right to publicly perform their recordings. 
The DPRA changed this by adding a public performance right for sound recordings by digital 
transmission only—public performances through analog transmissions remained unprotected. As a 
result, radio stations broadcasting over AM or FM bands had to pay royalties only for performing 
copyrighted musical works, while internet broadcasts required royalties for both the copyrighted 
sound recording and any copyrighted musical works contained therein. 
 
During the Copyright Office’s pre-1972 recordings study, recording industry advocates resisted 
federalization, but subsequently began pressing for a digital performance right in parity with 
copyrighted sound recordings. In 2013, a Copyright Office study on Music Licensing Study revisited 
the question of pre-1972 recordings, with the report reiterating the Office’s support for full 
federalization while also recognizing an industry-supported proposal for partial federalization—one 
which would expand the federal licensing statutes to include pre-1972 recordings, but leave the rest 
of the law as is.46 The RESPECT Act of 201447 would have followed this latter recommendation, but 
it found little support and never received a committee vote. 
 
In addition to pursuing partial federalization, recording industry stakeholders also found some initial 
support for the notion that the common law included an exclusive right of public performance. In Flo 
& Eddie v. Sirius XM, a series of lawsuits (along with similar suits brought against Pandora) sought to 
show that a digital public performance right, such as that provided by federal law, also existed at the 
 
43 Pub. L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, effective Mar. 11, 2009. 
44 Perhaps anticipating the report, Rep. Jared Polis (D-CO-2) introduced possibly the first legislation to address the issue, 
the Sound Recording Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 2933 (112th Congress), but the bill received no cosponsors and 
failed in committee. 
45 Pub. L. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, effective Feb. 1, 1996. 
46 Copyright and the Music Marketplace, 87. 
47 Respecting Senior Performers as Essential Cultural Treasures Act, H.R. 4772 (113th Congress). 
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state level. After an initial finding in California that it did, courts in New York48 and Florida49 found 
that there was no such protection. With signs increasingly pointing to legislation as the only means to 
a public performance right for pre-1972 sound recordings, the stage was set for movement in Congress 
on the long-standing and fraught question of what to do with the oldest sound recordings. Congress’s 
answer came from Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA-49), who introduced the CLASSICS Act on July 19, 2017.50 
An amended version became law as the Classics Protection and Access Act (“CPAA”). 
 
The new law falls short the Copyright Office’s and NRPP’s recommendation that pre-1972 sound 
recordings be fully federalized, but it does functionally meet the essence of their recommendations. 
Though it does so in an inelegant fashion, the CPAA does at least federalize the exclusive rights to 
use a pre-1972 sound recording, as well as the exceptions to those rights. The law strikes a compromise 
between the differing term length recommendations by instituting a progressive term length, with later 
recordings generally enjoying somewhat longer protection. The CPAA does not include the possibly 
beneficial incentives for rerelease recommended by the Copyright Office, but in excluding that 
recommendation Congress also sidestepped sticky and potentially worrisome discussions, such as 
whether a physical format release would be required or whether a license-restricted stream or digital 
download would be sufficient to qualify. 
 
The CPAA also, and unexpectedly, partially addresses the two additional legislative recommendations 
made by the NRPP. The Plan recommended enabling “recordings whose copyright owners cannot be 
identified or located to be more readily preserved and accessed legally.”51 Though not the extensive 
orphan works plan that the authors of the NRPP may have envisioned, the CPAA addresses this 
recommendation through the creation of a safe harbor for noncommercial uses. The Plan also 
recommends expansion and updating of the Section 108 library and archives exceptions,52 and though 
many of the Plan’s recommendations along those lines are still wanting, one such recommendation—
to expand the “last twenty years” provision to apply to the last 45 years of copyright in a sound 
recording—is actually exceeded by the new law. 
 
The CPAA is a major step forward for sound recordings curators and memory institutions. Though 
there is much yet to demand from Congress in future legislation, this act should remedy many of the 
most critical legal obstacles faced by those charged with preserving the country’s recorded heritage. 
 
48 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 483 (2016). 
49 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So.3d 305 (Fla. 2017). 
50 Another bill, the Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership Act, H.R. 3350 (115th Congress) was introduced just a day 
later and would have directed the creation of a “nondramatic musical works and sound recordings database,” and would 
have set inclusion of a work in that database as a condition for collecting damages in certain infringements of the work. 
The bill was not acted upon but appears to have formed a partial basis for the recordation requirements that were added 
as part of the CPAA. 
51 National Recording Preservation Board, The Library of Congress National Recording Preservation Plan (Council on Library and 
Information Resources and the Library of Congress, 2012), recommendation 3.5. 
52 National Recording Preservation Plan, recommendation 3.6. 
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OVERVIEW OF PROVISIONS 
 
A. PROTECTION OF PRE-1972 RECORDINGS 
 
 
The CPAA prohibits unauthorized use of pre-1972 recordings in a manner separate from, but nearly 
identical to copyright infringement. Any use that would infringe copyright in a post-1972 (i.e., 
“copyrighted”) recording is, for the most part, now infringing for pre-1972 recordings. 
 
1. Scope of protection 
• Pre-1972 sound recordings receive protection virtually identical to the copyright 
protection afforded later recordings 
Section 1401(a) specifies that engaging in covered activities without consent of the rights owner is 
punishable to the same extent as copyright infringement.53 “Covered activities” is defined elsewhere, 
in Sec. 1401(l), as any activity that would have been considered infringing had the recording been fixed 
after February 15, 1972.  
 
Specifically, Sec. 1401(l) defines covered activities as applying to the following activities: 
 
1) Any act that would infringe on the exclusive rights to reproduce, make derivatives, distribute, 
or digitally perform the work, as found in Sec. 106 
2) Any infringing exportation or importation of the recording under Sec. 602(a) 
3) Any circumvention of copyright protection systems in violation of Sec. 1201 
4) Any violation of the copyright management information protections in Sec. 1202 
 
Though the statute draws a difference between copyright protection and CPAA protection, the 
practical result is the same. In addition, CPAA infringements are subject to the same statute of 
limitations as copyright infringements—3 years.  
 
2. Limitations on scope –  
• Protection of pre-1972 recordings is limited in scope in a manner nearly, but not 
completely, identical to later recordings  
In defining the covered activities, Sec. 1401(h) specifies that protection applies to “any activity that 
the copyright owner of a sound recording would have the exclusive right to do or authorize under 
section 106… if the sound recording were fixed on or after February 15, 1972.” 
 
The scope of federal copyright in sound recordings is more limited than that available for other classes 
of works. Section 114 specifies those limitations. Any action that falls outside the scope specified by 
Sec. 114 should also fall outside the scope of protection under the Sec. 1401.  
 
 
53 But see discussion of criminal infringement below, part II.G.5, page 49. 
• Pre-1972 sound recordings are protected against unauthorized uses to the same extent as 
copyrighted sound recordings. 
• Public performance of pre-1972 recordings through non-digital transmission does not 
infringe CPAA protection. 
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One example is public performance. Though section 106 includes an exclusive right of public 
performance for copyrighted works, in the case of sound recordings that right is limited to 
performance through a digital transmission. Section 114 reiterates the fact that the exclusive right to 
public performance of a sound recording does not include analog performances, such as live 
performances in public spaces through traditional sound systems, or terrestrial radio broadcasts. Sec. 
114 also limits the exclusive rights in sound recordings to the actual sounds contained in the recording—
sound-alike recordings that do not directly copy the original’s sounds do not infringe the exclusive 
rights in copyrighted sound recordings; likewise they do not infringe the rights contained in Sec. 1401 
for pre-1972 sound recordings. It bears repeating that these limitations in scope are not shared by any 
other class of copyrightable work. In particular, any underlying musical or literary works must be 
licensed for analog public performances.  
 
Though the CPAA does not provide rights holders with any protection against analog performances, 
the law does create one minor caveat. The new law states that if a non-covered activity was protected 
by a state or the common law prior to the passage of the Act, then those protections are not 
preempted.54 The law does not take a position on whether there is such state or common law protection, 
it only provides that the protection is not preempted if it existed prior to passage of the CPAA. 
Terrestrial radio broadcasts and other non-digital performances would seem to qualify as activities 
that are not covered under the CPAA, that could be protected under a state law. No state appears to 
have passed any such legislation prior to enactment of the CPAA,55 but the possibility remains that 
courts could find that common law protection existed prior to October 11, 2018, in which case this 
language would be applied.56 Were there such a law, its application would be subject to the term limits 
specified by the CPAA. 
 
54 17 U.S.C. 301(c). 
55 Tennessee considered, but did not pass a bill to create a public performance right in sound recordings that would have 
included terrestrial broadcast. Legacy Sound Recording Protection Act, HB 1603/SB 1792, Tennessee General Assembly, 
Introduced Feb. 6, 2018. http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/110/Bill/SB1792.pdf  
56 Given findings to the contrary in the Flo & Eddie cases, this is unlikely. 
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B. LENGTH OF PROTECTION 
 
 
The protections created by the CPAA are more limited than the state protections they replaced. Pre-
1972 recordings are protected under the provisions of the Act for a transition term of 95 years from 
the date of publication. The actual term of protection varies depending on the date of publication: 
 
Date Published Term of protection Expires57 
Before Jan. 1, 1923 3 years after enactment Jan. 1, 2022 
Jan. 1, 1923 – Dec. 31, 1946 Transition period + 5 years 100 years after publication 
Jan. 1, 1947 – Dec. 31, 1956 Transition period + 15 years 110 years after publication 
All other pre-1972 recordings Through Sec. 301(c) expiration Feb. 15, 2067 
 
After the expiration of its term of protection, all uses of a recording that fall under the covered 
activities should be unrestricted at both the federal and state level, similar to the entry of a copyrighted 
work into the public domain. 
 
Though the CPAA applies to all recordings fixed prior to the enactment of the Sound Recordings Act, 
the term of protection is based on the date of publication.58 Because of this, unpublished pre-1972 
recordings do not have a transition period, and so are protected through February 15, 2067.59 Because 
the legal definition of publication does not include public performances or broadcasts, this means 
that, for example, radio broadcast transcriptions continue to be protected through 2067.60 The statute 
makes clear that all federal protection, for all pre-1972 recordings, ends no later than that date.  
 
During the Copyright Office’s hearings, there was debate over whether the term of protection should 
begin with the creation, or fixation, of the recording, or whether the term of protection should be 
based, as it is for all other copyrighted works, on the date of first publication. Despite concerns raised 
 
57 Based on the specified 95-year transition period. The expiration dates are, in principle, moveable. Should Congress opt 
to change the base transition term (perhaps in the event of another extension of copyright term), then the terms of 
protection would lengthen accordingly. 
58 Under the Copyright Act, publication is “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group 
of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public 
performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.” 17 U.S.C. 101. Federal courts have ruled that 
pre-1972 recordings are published according to this definition. See La Cienega Music Company v. Z.Z. Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th 
Cir., 2018). 
59 Despite this, their use by libraries and archives is in some ways less restricted than published recordings. Because 
unpublished pre-1972 recordings are almost by definition not subject to commercial exploitation, they are generally 
subject to the Sec. 108(h) rule (see part II.D, page 24). 
60 See 17 U.S.C. 101 “A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.” 
• Protection of pre-1972 sound recordings is limited based on date of publication. 
• Protection expires for first pre-1972 sound recordings on Jan. 1 2022. 
• Date of publication may be difficult to determine, but also to prove. 
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by both public interest groups61 and rights holders62 that determining publication date is “a nearly 
impossible factual task, in many instances,” the Office recommended using publication date.63  
 
Unfortunately, Congress’s decision to follow this recommendation will likely create some confusion 
for those attempting to determine whether protection has lapsed for a pre-1972 recording, since a 
recording’s fixation date is much more commonly available than its publication date, especially for 
earlier recordings. Users can, presumably, demonstrate that publication happened no later than the 
date of an existing catalogue that lists a recording, and there may be other, similar techniques to 
pinpoint the date further. In many cases, though, showing that protection has expired may be an 
intractable problem. Fortunately, there are sufficient exceptions to the law that most uses desired by 
sound recordings curators should still be possible. 
 
61 Federal Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: a report of the Register of Copyrights (February 2011), 152. 
62 Federal Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 153. 
63 Federal Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 163. “In order to ensure that federalization does not effect an unlawful 
taking, the Office recommends that all published pre-1972 sound recordings other than those first published before 
1923 receive a term of protection of 95 years from publication, and that all unpublished pre-1972 sound recordings 
receive a term of 120 years from creation.” 
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C.  LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION  
 
 
1. Exceptions included 
The Classics Protection and Access Act applies several of the most important federal copyright 
exceptions to the use of pre-1972 recordings. These exceptions apply to claims over covered activities 
to the same extent they apply to claims of copyright infringement. In some cases, the federal law is 
more restrictive than the state laws; in other cases, it is less so. What is most important is that, for the 
first time, limitations and exceptions apply to pre-1972 sound recordings consistently across the states. 
 
The CPAA applies fair use, library and archives exceptions, the first sale doctrine, the exceptions for 
public performance, and one exception for ephemeral copies. These amount to almost all the 
copyright exceptions that would apply to copyrighted (i.e., post-1971) sound recordings. 
 
a. Sec. 107 (fair use) 
• Formally extended to pre-1972 recordings 
The CPAA fully incorporates the federal fair use doctrine as codified in Sec. 107 of the Copyright Act. 
Fair uses of copyrighted works do not infringe copyright. Whether a use is fair is ultimately determined 
by courts based on a number of factors, including four factors specifically prescribed by the statute—
the purpose and character of the use made; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the entire work; and the effect that the use might have 
on existing or potential markets for the copyrighted work. In codifying the four-factor test, Congress 
endorsed a process the courts had been using for more than a century. Congress also specified certain 
classes of uses that it contemplated as potentially fair: “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, [and] research.” 
  
There was some question, prior to the CPAA’s passage, as to whether, and to what extent, the doctrine 
already applied to the use of pre-1972 sound recordings as a matter of the states’ common law. Fair 
use had been a part of the common law for more than 120 years by the time of its statutory 
enshrinement in the 1976 Act,64 and it is widely understood as being constitutionally essential under 
the First Amendment’s free speech protection.65 
 
Though fair use likely existed in some form in every state, only one—New York—had actually made 
an affirmative finding that this was the case. In EMI Records v. Premise Media, a trial court found that 
the defendant had made fair use of a pre-1972 sound recording through its inclusion in a motion 
picture.66 However, as significant as it was as the first (and only) finding of fair use under a state law, 
 
64 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
65 See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012). 
66 EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp. L.P., 2008 NY Slip Op 33157(U), 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8213. 
• Most exceptions to copyright also apply to pre-1972 sound recordings. 
o Fair use fully applies—resolves questions about applicability in state laws. 
o Sec. 108 applies with some modifications specific to pre-1972 recordings. 
o Secs. 109 and 110 apply, but the result is more restrictive than before. 
• Recordation requirements apply. 
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the ruling created no binding precedent even within the state.67 Though the ruling was persuasively 
argued and might well have influenced other courts were the opportunity to present itself, courts in 
other states, and even other courts in New York, could have made entirely different findings.  
 
If the Constitution required the existence of some form of fair use at the state level, it did not require 
any particular implementation of the doctrine. The New York court followed the guidance of the 
federal statute but was under no obligation to do so. State common law is the realm of the state courts, 
and each state would have been free, if presented with a case, to define fair use in its own way, provided 
that the interpretation satisfied the demands of the First Amendment. Different interpretations could 
have been more or less restrictive than the federal doctrine, could have been based on different factors, 
and would almost certainly have varied from state to state to some degree. 
 
By applying the federal statute to pre-1972 sound recordings Congress has insured that 180 years of 
fair use case law developed by the federal courts will also apply to pre-1972 sound recordings, and 
that as the doctrine continues to evolve it will apply to all recordings, without regard to an accident of 
its fixation date. 
 
b. Sec. 108 (exceptions for libraries and archives) 
• Applies to pre-1972 recordings, but with a special exception for pre-1972 
recordings 
The CPAA incorporates the Copyright Act’s specific exemptions for libraries and archives, found in 
Title 17, Section 108. These exceptions authorize libraries and archives to make reproductions of 
copyrighted works under certain conditions. Greatly simplified, Sec. 108 gives permission to libraries 
for the following: 
 
Subsection (a):  Isolated single copies 
Subsection (b): Copies of unpublished works for preservation, security, or deposit 
Subsection (c):  Copies of published works for replacement of damaged, deteriorating, lost, stolen, 
or obsolete items 
Subsection (d): Interlibrary loan copies of portions of works 
Subsection (e):  Interlibrary loan copies of entire works (when a copy is not available at a fair price) 
Subsection (h): Reproduction, distribution, display, and performance of works that are in the last 
20 years of their copyright term and are not being commercially exploited68 
 
Though the CPAA incorporates all of Sec. 108, the benefit of this to libraries is limited by 
subsection  (i), the final piece of Sec. 108. Under this limitation, the provisions of subsections (d) and 
(e) (“interlibrary loan provisions”) do not apply where the copies involve “a musical work, a pictorial, 
graphic or sculptural work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” As a result, libraries and 
 
67 The state’s recognition of fair use was not discussed by the courts again until 2017, when it was recognized by the Second 
Circuit in Flo & Eddie. However, it was mentioned only in passing, and in any case still did not create precedent as they 
were only interpreting the state’s law. 
68 The remaining subsections provide additional conditions and clarifications. Subsection (g) limits Sec. 108 to isolated, 
unrelated copies, and specifically prevents the application of Sec. 108 in cases where libraries engage in or have knowledge 
of systematic reproduction or distribution. Subsection (f) limits liability for libraries (and imposes liability on patrons) for 
copies made on unsupervised reproduction equipment, provides an exception for news footage in audiovisual works, and 
clarifies that fair use and contractual obligations are unaffected by Sec. 108. 
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archives do not have the interlibrary loan provisions available for any recording (pre-1972 or 
otherwise) that contains a copyrighted musical work. 
 
Though this limitation will exclude an enormous portion of recordings in libraries and archives, Sec. 
108 does still have use within the sound recordings collections. First, the provisions of subsections (b) 
and (c) (“preservation exceptions”) apply to all works, including musical works. Second, the 
interlibrary loan provisions still apply to recordings of literary works, such as readings of poems or 
plays, oral histories, or audio books, and also to recordings of musical works that have entered the 
public domain. Finally, fair use may still apply in cases where libraries may wish to apply the interlibrary 
loan provisions to sound recordings with copyrighted musical works. 
 
The Sec. 108(i) limitation does not restrict the application of subsection (h)—reproduction, 
distribution, display, and performance of works that are in the last 20 years of their copyright term 
and are not being commercially exploited. The CPAA provision surrounding that subsection is one of 
the most important pieces of the law and constitutes an important expansion of the library and 
archives exceptions. That provision, the so-called “last 20 years rule,” is discussed below (part II.D, 
page 29). 
 
c. Sec. 109 (“first sale” doctrine) 
• Probably already applied to pre-1972 recordings; now applies but with federal 
limitations 
The CPAA explicitly applies federal codification of the so-called “first sale doctrine,” sometimes called 
the “exhaustion doctrine” to pre-1972 sound recordings. Under this principle, the rights holder’s 
exclusive right to distribution of any given copy of a work ends with the first authorized distribution 
of that copy. This means that rights holders are not able to control secondary markets for their work 
such as secondhand sales or library lending. 
 
This right—the right to dispose of lawfully acquired copies of works—almost certainly already existed 
for pre-1972 recordings prior to passage of the MMA.69 What the CPAA changed is how the doctrine 
applies to pre-1972 recordings. Sec. 109 replaces the relatively simple common law principle with 
statutory language, and as a consequence pre-1972 recordings are also subject to the limitations 
imposed by the statute. The law has two limitations which might affect pre-1972 sound recordings, 
though there does not appear to be evidence that those limitations have affected the first sale principle 
in sound recordings in any practical way. 
 
The first limitation concerns sound recordings whose copyright has been restored by the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act of 1994 (see discussion in part II.G.3, page 45). The URAA amended Sec. 109 
to restrict distribution of copies of foreign works made prior to December 8, 1994.70 Sec. 109 states 
that those copies may not be “sold or otherwise disposed of without the authorization of the owner” 
 
69 The Supreme Court first recognized the principle in 1908, seventy years before its codification in Sec. 109 went into 
effect, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Though the states were not bound by the decision or by the federal 
law it codified, the principle’s application to pre-1972 recordings was never seriously questioned. 
70 Since all such recordings have been governed by federal law since that date, this does not actually represent a change 
made by the CPAA, but it is discussed here for the sake of completeness. 
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for any direct or indirect commercial advantage if the copyright owner has filed a notice of intent to 
enforce with the Copyright Office.71 
 
The second limitation applies to distribution other than by transfer of ownership. The first sale 
principle does not apply to rental, lease, or lending of sound recordings, except in the case of a library 
or nonprofit educational institution. Private collectors or used record stores, for example, may sell or 
give away recordings, but they may not rent or lend them for any direct or indirect commercial 
advantage. Prior to the CPAA, this restriction would not have applied to pre-1972 recordings; under 
the new law it applies to all recordings. 
 
d. Sec. 110 (public performances) 
• Applies to pre-1972 recordings, resulting in increased restriction. 
Section 110 limits copyright owners’ exclusive right to publicly perform a work, and the CPAA 
incorporates three of the limitations found in this section.72 The right only controls public 
performances, but the definition of “public” is somewhat broader than common understandings of 
the term.  
 
A “public” performance includes traditional live performances in public places as well as performances 
in non-public places where “the public” is gathered. In addition, any broadcast or other transmission 
of a work constitutes a public performance if the transmission is available to the public, whether or 
not members of the public receive it in the same place or at the same time. For purposes of these 
definitions, “the public” consists of “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances.” Traditionally understood, a public performance would require an 
audience of at least one person, but under this definition, for example, uploading a video to a public 
platform such as YouTube constitutes a public performance whether or not the video is ever viewed.73 
 
Prior to the CPAA, pre-1972 sound recordings were not subject to an exclusive right of public 
performance.74 Because federal law contains a public performance right for digital audio transmission, 
this is one area of the law where the CPAA created a more restrictive regime than existed before. 
Under the old law, there was no restriction at all on public performance of pre-1972 sound 
recordings—under the new law there is a restriction, but with exceptions. The inclusion of the Sec. 
110 exceptions is very important—early versions of the bill did not include the exceptions, and had 
they passed there would have been no explicit allowance for, among other things, classroom teaching. 
 
71 17 U.S.C. 109(a). The law specifies that any such works may be distributed without consent within the 12-month period 
following either the publication of a notice or that notice is served upon the party. The URAA required the notices to be 
filed with the copyright office within 24 months of restoration, a window which has long since passed. 17 U.S.C. 
104(d)(2)(A). If the rights holder did not file a notice with the Copyright Office, they may still serve a direct notice to a 
reliance party (i.e., a party whose actions would not have been infringing prior to restoration), at which point the reliance 
party may continue to pursue their actions for 12 months from the date the notice is received. 17 U.S.C. 104(d)(2)(B). 
72 Sec. 110 includes eleven limitations of the exclusive right to public performance. Eight of those limitations apply only 
to classes of works other than sound recordings, so though in principle the CPAA applies to all eleven limitations, in 
practice only the three discussed here are applicable. 
73 “[T]he Office concludes that reading the statutory provisions in light of the purposes articulated by Congress indicates 
that the public performance right encompasses offers to stream.” U.S. Copyright Office, The Making Available Right in the 
United States: A report of the Register of Copyrights (February 2016). 
 https://www.copyright.gov/docs/making_available/making-available-right.pdf  
74 No state had enacted a statute governing public performance rights, and the Flo & Eddie cases left little doubt that the 
common law also did not reach public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings. 
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However, like the inclusion of Sec 109, the change over the pre-MMA situation is seen not in the 
availability of the exception itself, but by the limitations placed on the exception.  
 
CLASSROOM INSTRUCTION 
The most important piece of Sec. 110 for purposes of this document is the exceptions found in Sec. 
110(1) and (2), which allow for use in teaching settings. Section 110(1), which was included in the 1976 
Copyright Act, provides an essential exception to copyright for teaching in a classroom setting. The 
statute allows performances by instructors and students conducting the teaching business of a 
nonprofit educational institution, as long as the performance takes place in a classroom “or similar 
place devoted to instruction.” The only other restriction is that when a performance of a motion 
picture or audiovisual work is involved, the copy must be lawfully made—all other performances, 
including those of sound recordings, may be made from any copies, whether or not they are lawfully 
made.75 Most traditional performances of copyrighted sound recordings in classroom settings are 
noninfringing without Sec. 110(1), because they are not digital transmissions; however, the statute 
does ensure that any digital transmissions of sound recordings are also permissible. 
 
Section 110(2) is more complicated. Added in 2002 as part of the TEACH Act,76 the statute created 
an additional teaching exception for transmissions in the course of distance education. Unlike the 
classroom exception, there are numerous restrictions on the use of Sec. 110(2), including the 
requirement that the performance consist of “reasonable and limited portions” (except with respect 
to nondramatic literary and musical works) and that the copy be lawfully made.77  
 
Prior to the MMA, there were no restrictions at all on public performances of pre-1972 sound 
recordings.78 The CPAA restricted the use of pre-1972 recordings in teaching activities. However, by 
incorporating Sec. 110 into the CPAA, Congress at least ensured that pre-1972 recordings were treated 
no differently than other classes of works, including post-1972 recordings.  
 
AMBIENT PERFORMANCES 
In addition to the teaching exceptions, Sec. 110(5) provides an allowance for performances of 
copyrighted works in public via simple playback devices, even if digital. The CPAA extends this 
exception to digital performance of pre-1972 sound recordings. 
 
A coffee shop proprietor who brings a radio in and turns it on for the benefit of the shop’s customers, 
for example, might be infringing copyright of the musical works being performed were it not for this 
exception.79 Because public performances of sound recordings on analog systems do not infringe 
 
75 17 U.S.C. 110(1). 
76 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 107-273. Subtitle C, Sec. 13301: Technology, 
Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002. 116 Stat. 1910. 
77 The intricacies of Sec. 110(2) are beyond the scope of this document, but a decision tree is included as Appendix C, 
page 83.  
78 Except where they are subject to restoration under the Uruguay Round Agreement Act; see discussion in Part II.G.3., 
page 45. 
79 This is not to say that coffee shops, restaurants, and other establishments are exempted from paying for public 
performances for musical works. The exception doesn’t apply to performances over commercial sound systems, only those 
made on a “single apparatus of the kind commonly used in private homes.” Owners of commercial establishments have 
additional guidelines to follow. In many cases, such as where built-in sound systems are involved, establishments must 
license the music they play. Sec. 110(5) provides some exceptions for public performance in establishments when specific 
conditions are met. Those conditions are complex and are beyond the scope of this document. For more information, see: 
https://www.restaurant.org/articles/operations/11-questions-about-music-licensing  
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copyright, many of the uses provided for by Sec. 110(5) are already excepted where sound recordings 
are concerned. However, more common modern applications—where, for example, the coffee shop 
owner is instead playing music on a computer or CD player—are digital audio transmissions, and as 
such would infringe copyrights in both the musical work and the sound recording. Sec. 110(5) allows 
for public performances of this sort for copyrighted sound recordings, and now the CPAA extends 
that exception to pre-1972 sound recordings. 
 
e. Sec. 112(f): ephemeral recordings to allow public performance  
• Necessary extension of Sec. 110, possibly not previously permitted  
Though Sec. 110(2) permits performing works in an online teaching environment, those performances 
cannot be made without also reproducing the works to be performed. The nonprofit teaching 
exception in Sec. 110(2) (see above) would be unusable if the law prohibited making the copies needed 
in order to make those performances possible. These ephemeral copies are permitted under Sec. 112(f). 
 
Under Sec. 112(f), educational institutions and governmental organizations may make copies of 
copyrighted works in digital form that are necessary to perform that work if they are entitled to do so 
under the online teaching exception in Sec. 110(2). Sec. 112(f) also allows copies of analog formats, 
but only if no version in digital form is available to the institution that is not subject to technological 
protection measures.80 
 
In order to take advantage of this exception, the copies must be used only by the institution making 
the reproduction, and they may be used only for purposes of transmissions that are authorized by Sec. 
110(2). Sec. 112(f) does not permit the recordings to be made or used, for example, under the face-
to-face teaching exception, Sec. 110(1), though in the latter case such reproductions might well qualify 
as fair uses.81 
 
Though public performances had been fully permitted under the state laws, the creation of ephemeral 
recordings in order to make those performances was, in many cases, not explicitly provided. Though 
Sec. 110 may be seen mostly as further restricting public performances of pre-1972 recordings, the 
inclusion of Sec. 112(f) is a minor change in the opposite direction.82  Between Secs 110(2) and 112(f), 
the law’s provisions for online teaching now apply equally to pre-1972 recordings as they do to 
copyrighted works. 
 
f. Limitations on liability 
• Reduced penalties for honest mistakes  
Congress has identified actions which, while still copyright infringement, should be less harshly 
penalized or strictly enforced. These provisions play an important role in the risk management analysis 
many institutions conduct when determining how to proceed with a project. The CPAA applied two 
such provisions to pre-1972 recordings. 
 
80 Neither the law nor the legislative history includes discussion of what Congress intends by the term, “digital form.” 
Conflation of the terms, “analog,” and “physical” is a very common error, even among specialists, and it is possible that 
the drafters of this exception made the same mistake. However, absent guidance to the contrary, it is presumed here that 
Congress intended what it wrote, and that “digital form” includes physical media in digital formats, such as compact discs 
and digital audio tape.  
81 Performances in live classroom situations are likely to be noninfringing, since in many cases they will not constitute 
digital audio transmissions. In those cases, creation of ephemeral recordings is presumably unnecessary in the first place. 
82 The Act also incorporates the provision, in Sec. 112(g), clarifying that any transmissions made using the ephemeral 
copies exceptions may not themselves be considered copyrightable derivative works. 
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STATUTORY DAMAGE REMISSION 
The CPAA applies civil penalties for infringement, as provided in Secs. 502–505, “to the same extent 
as an infringer of copyright.” This includes the statutory damages provisions in Sec. 504. However, 
Sec. 504 also removes the possibility of statutory damages when the infringement is committed by 
libraries, archives, or nonprofit educational institutions, and where the defendant can show a 
reasonable belief that the use was fair under Sec. 107. The provision does not require a court to litigate 
whether the use actually was fair, only whether the infringer “believed or had reasonable grounds for 
believing” that it was. Because infringements under the CPAA are treated as though they were 
infringements of copyright, this damage remission appears also to apply to pre-1972 recordings. 
 
An additional damage remission provision, found in Sec. 412, is not included in the CPAA. However, 
an equivalent provision is included, and is discussed below under filing requirements (part II.E, page 
31). 
 
SEC. 512—SAFE HARBOR FOR ONLINE ENTITIES 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act placed limits on the liability of online service providers, such 
as YouTube or Vimeo, for content that is posted on their platforms by users of those platforms. This 
“safe harbor,” found in Sec. 512, is controversial and is the subject of heavy litigation as well as a 
recent study by the U.S Copyright Office and ongoing Congressional discussion.83  
 
2. Exceptions not included 
Most of the explicit copyright exceptions that are relevant to sound recordings are included in the 
CPAA. However, the Act was not all inclusive. The Act omitted certain minor exceptions for making 
of ephemeral copies that might have been useful to sound recordings curators in unusual 
circumstances. 
 
SEC. 112: EPHEMERAL COPIES 
• Partial application to pre-1972 recordings 
Though, as discussed above, the CPAA applies one such exception that allow institutions to make the 
copies needed to take advantage of the online teaching exception, the Act does not apply any other 
exceptions for ephemeral copies. Sec. 112 includes several additional provisions for ephemeral copies, 
including general permission to make ephemeral copies for any use of a copyrighted work (except an 
audiovisual work, such as a motion picture) that is permitted by a license. None of those additional 
exceptions apply with respect to pre-1972 recordings. 
 
In particular, Sec. 112 includes two exceptions that apply to governmental bodies’ and nonprofit 
organizations’ use of sound recordings, neither of which are applicable to pre-1972 recordings: 
 
• Under Sec. 112(b), institutions that engage in educational activities under Sec. 110(2) may also 
make copies of the transmissions themselves, possibly for retransmitting to future classes, 
including any copyrighted works contained therein. 
• Sec. 112(c) allows qualifying institutions to make ephemeral copies of transmissions in order 
to retransmit those transmissions if they are also lawfully entitled to make the transmission. 
 




Neither of these exceptions is available under the CPAA. Institutions making use of ephemeral copies 
of their broadcast teaching activities may not archive those classes for purposes of retransmission. 
However, as doing so may well constitute a fair use, the loss of these two exceptions is probably of 
only minor consequence. 
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D. THE “LAST 20 YEARS” RULE, EXPANDED 
 
 
Under the CPAA, the provisions of Section 108(h) of the Copyright Act apply with respect to all pre-
1972 recordings. Section 108(h) allows libraries and archives to make extensive use of copyrighted 
published works that are in the last twenty years of their copyright term and are not being commercially 
exploited. The new law applies those provisions to all pre-1972 recordings, regardless of their term of 
protection and whether or not the recording has been published. 
 
1. Section 108(h) 
The copyright exceptions with respect to use by libraries and archives (also discussed above) include 
a special exception, which was added to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 
1998 as a compromise. The CTEA extended copyright terms by twenty years for all works that were 
not, at the time of enactment, in the public domain. As partial relief for the term extension, Congress 
added Sec. 108(h), which allows libraries some latitude to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display 
copyrighted works that are in the last twenty years of their copyright term.  
 
The exception is not unlimited—it does not confer the same freedom to use works that would have 
existed had the works been allowed to enter the public domain. The exception is limited to works that 
are not being commercially exploited, and it is limited to uses that fall within the contexts of 
preservation, scholarship, and research. The exception is also limited to published works (though, as 
we shall see, not in the case of pre-1972 recordings). 
 
Use of Section 108(h) requires a “reasonable search” to determine whether a work is subject to 
“normal commercial exploitation.” The statute does not define “commercial exploitation,” and so the 
term is subject to interpretation. The contours of a “reasonable search” are similarly undefined; 
however, if an unused copy can be obtained at a reasonable price, the Sec. 108(h) exception does not 
apply.84 
 
2. Section 1401(f)(1)(B) 
Because the CPAA applies Sec. 108 to all covered activities, the “last twenty years” exception also 
applies to uses of pre-1972 recordings. However, the Act goes further by applying Sec. 108(h) to all 
pre-1972 recordings, not just those in the last twenty years of protection. It achieves this through a bit 
of statutory magic—a rule of construction—by redefining the phrase “the last 20 years of any term of 
copyright of a published work” to mean, in the context of pre-1972 recordings, “any time after the 
date of enactment [of the MMA].” 
 
84 In addition, Sec. 108(h) may not be applied if a copyright holder provides notice to the Copyright Office that their work 
is subject to commercial exploitation (whether or not it actually is). However, as of at least 2017 the Office had received 
no such notices. The Office has recommended that a future revision of Sec. 108 strike this third market check as being 
extraneous. United States Copyright Office. Section 108 of Title 17: A discussion document of the Register of Copyrights (September 
2017), p. 44. https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section108/discussion-document.pdf  
• Libraries and archives may reproduce, distribute, and perform recordings 
• Applies to all pre-1972 recordings not subject to normal commercial exploitation  
• Applies to published and unpublished recordings 
• Requires a reasonable investigation (not subject to regulation) 
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In addition, the statute expands the scope of coverage for Sec. 108(h) to include both published and 
unpublished pre-1972 recordings. For most classes of works, Sec. 108(h) applies only to published 
works. In the case of pre-1972 recordings, because of the way the statute was worded, it is clear that 
the new rule of construction means that Sec. 108(h) applies regardless of publication status.85 Because 
of this, Sec. 108(h) may now prove especially useful to libraries and archives with extensive collections 
of unpublished recordings, such as archival recital or ethnographic recordings. 
 
Unlike the noncommercial use provisions of Sec. 1401(c) (discussed in part II.F, page 33), Sec. 108(h) 
leaves the determination of eligibility to the user, without prescribing regulations for making 
determinations of commercial availability. Additionally, none of the requirements, regulations, or 
other oversight that are connected to Sec. 1401(c) are applicable under Sec. 108(h). As such, libraries 
and archives that qualify under Sec. 108(h) are unlikely to find any additional benefit from the Sec. 
1401(c) noncommercial use provisions. 
 
The expansion of Sec. 108(h) constitutes a unique instance where Congress expanded limitations and 
exceptions to copyright without simultaneously placing burdens on the use of those exceptions. The 
new rule raises the possibility of applications that may well extend beyond the reach of the fair use 




85 See 2 Nimmer on Copyright 8.03[E][3][b] “As of 1998, the archival privilege during the last twenty years extended only to 
published works. As to old sound recordings, by contrast, the 2018 language dispenses with that requirement. The result 
is to expose unpublished pre-1972 sound recordings as well to immediate exploitation under the above dispensation.” 
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E. FILING REQUIREMENT AND STATUTORY LICENSING 
 
Though the CPAA does not include the full gamut of registration requirements and statutory licensing 
that would have come with full federalization, the law does include some parallel provisions, and in 
some respects those provisions are improvements over those governing copyrighted works. The 
presence of these regulations represents a major, and largely unheralded improvement over the original 
CLASSICS Act, which contained no filing requirement and very little in the way of statutory licensing. 
 
1. Filing with the Copyright Office 
Owners of rights in pre-1972 sound recordings must file information on their recordings with the 
Copyright Office as a prerequisite to certain damages. Under the CPAA, courts may not award 
statutory damages or attorney’s fees in any cases where the infringement involves a pre-1972 sound 
recording that is not indexed, or in any cases where the infringement occurs within 90 days of the date 
the recording was indexed.  
 
This mostly mimics, and partially improves, the registration-based damage remission that applies to 
copyrighted works, including post-1972 sound recordings. Under sec. 412, a copyright owner cannot 
collect statutory damages or attorneys’ fees in the infringement of an unregistered work when either 
the work was unpublished, or the work was published and not registered within 90 days of publication. 
Though the CPAA specifically declines to apply Sec. 412 to pre-1972 sound recordings,86 the effect of 
the new filing requirement is functionally identical, with the exception that infringements within 90 
days of the date a pre-1972 sound recording is indexed into the Copyright Office’s records (or, where 
a notice of contact information has been filed, after the entity receives the notice) are also given 
damage remission. 
 
The CPAA directs the Copyright Office to make the metadata it receives searchable by the public. 
The information collected is to be determined by the Office, but must include, at a minimum, the title 
and the names of the artist(s) and rights owner(s). Currently, in addition to the required information, 
the Office optionally collects the recordings’ International Standard Recording Code (ISRC), alternate 
title and artist names, version, album title(s), label, rights holder contact information, and publication 
year.87  The Office has created an online searchable database of this information.88 
 
2. Statutory licensing 
As discussed above, the U.S. copyright law includes licensing schemes for music and sound recordings 
not found with respect to any other class of works. The CPAA essentially incorporates the two 
licensing regimes for sound recordings, found in Sec. 114 (public performance by digital transmission) 
 
86 17 U.S.C. 1401(f)(5)(C). 
87 Instructions and forms for filing schedules of recordings may be found at the Copyright Office’s website: 
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/schedulefiling-instructions.html 
88 The database may be found, here: https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-
soundrecordings/search-soundrecordings.html  
• Directs the establishment of a Copyright Office database of pre-1972 recordings metadata 
• Filing with the Copyright Office is required to be eligible for statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees 
• Sec. 114 and 112 statutory licenses are available for pre-1972 recordings 
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and Sec. 112 (ephemeral recordings). The intricacies of these licensing mechanisms are beyond the 
scope of this document; however, the CPAA provides that uses that would satisfy either of those 
statutory licenses in the case of post-1972 sound recordings, are now also considered licensed in the 
case of pre-1972 recordings.
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F. NONCOMMERCIAL USES OF PRE-1972 RECORDINGS 
 
The CPAA introduces a new provision for the use of recordings that are not being commercially 
exploited. Sec. 1401(c) creates a process by which a user may identify and make use of eligible 
recordings, provided that the rights holder does not explicitly object. Uses that follow the process as 
outlined in the statute (and as further expanded upon by the Copyright Office) are non-infringing and 
are immune from damages for the duration of the use described in the notice.89 
 
1. Statutory Requirements 
In order to qualify for the safe harbor, the statute requires the prospective user to follow each of the 
following steps: 
 
1) Search—Make a “good faith, reasonable search” (see below) to determine whether the 
recording is being commercially exploited by the rights holder; 
2) Notice—File a notice with the U.S. Copyright Office identifying the recording and describing 
the planned usage;90 and 
3) Wait—Allow 90 days from the date the notice is indexed in the Copyright Office’s records 
for the rights holder to object to the use. 
 
GOOD FAITH SEARCH 
Sec. 1401(c) demands that the prospective user engage in a “good faith, reasonable search” in order 
to qualify for the safe harbor. The statute provides two requirements for a good faith search: 
 
1) A search of the Copyright Office’s database of pre-1972 sound recordings, and 
2) A search in “services offering a comprehensive set of sound recordings for sale or streaming.” 
 
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION 
Neither the statute nor the Copyright Office defines the term, “commercial exploitation.”  Based on 
its rulemaking, the Office understands the term to include, at a minimum, when a recording is available 
“for sale in download form or as a new (not resale) physical product, or through a streaming service.” 
However, the Office does not exclude the possibility that commercial exploitation might take other 
forms. Most digital music providers do not sell recordings so much as they sell licenses to use 
recordings. It may be presumed, though, that sale of such licenses also constitutes commercial 
exploitation under the Office’s understanding. 
 
 
89 Uses made under Sec. 1401(c) may still infringe copyright in pre-1972 recordings whose copyrights were restored under 
Sec. 104A. See part II.G.3, page 45, for discussion of pre-1972 recordings made outside the United States. 
90 Forms and instructions can be found, here: 
 https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/NNUfiling-instructions.html  
• Provides a safe harbor for noncommercial use of pre-1972 sound recordings. 
• Noncommercial is undefined. 
• Requires a “good faith, reasonable search,” and notice of proposed use. 
• Copyright Office regulation constitutes a maximum of what is required. 
• Libraries and archives may wish to consider applying Sec. 108(h) first. 
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NONCOMMERCIAL USE 
Neither the statute nor the accompanying regulations define “noncommercial use.” The statute says 
only that recovering costs does not necessarily make the use commercial (meaning, by extension, that it 
could), and that commercial entities may make use of the safe harbor for noncommercial uses. The 
Copyright Office does not evaluate filings to determine whether the proposed use is, in fact 
noncommercial.91 This means that even a user that follows the steps prescribed by the statute may still 
be vulnerable to challenges that the use is commercial, including resultant litigation. 
 
2. Copyright Office Regulation 
Except as described above, the statute does not provide any guidance on what constitutes a good faith, 
reasonable search, but it directs the Copyright Office to add clarity through regulation. After rounds 
of public comments and ex parte meetings with interested parties), the Office released its final rule in 
April 2019.92 
 
The rule outlines what the Copyright Office describes as a progressive search—where a user follows 
each of the steps in order, and a positive result in any step indicates commercial exploitation. A user 
that completes all of the steps without a positive result may assume that the work is not commercially 
exploited and so can be used under the safe harbor provisions.  
 
SUFFICIENT BUT NOT NECESSARY 
 
The Rule is a way of determining with relative certainty whether a recording is eligible for use under 
Sec. 1401(c), but it is not the only way of making that determination. The statute specifies that the 
Copyright Office’s prescriptions are “sufficient, but not necessary” for satisfying the good faith 
requirement.93 In other words, they do not constitute the only definition of “good faith, reasonable 
search.” This leaves open the possibility of arriving at other protocols that also satisfy the two 
statutory requirements. 
 
Following the regulations does create safety, by guaranteeing that the statutory requirement is satisfied. 
However, some of the steps are problematic in that they are indicative of copyright ownership but not 
necessarily of commercial exploitation. A search that follows the Copyright Office’s guidelines might 
eliminate many recordings that would otherwise be eligible for use under the safe harbor. Potential 
users of Sec. 1401(c) may wish to develop their own policies for conducting good faith searches.  
 
Following the Office’s rule ensures that a search qualifies, but a less extensive search may also qualify. 
The Office’s rule may thus be viewed as defining the maximum, rather than the minimum steps 




91 The Copyright Office does not currently provide guidance on what constitutes commercial use; however, the Office 
stated in its rulemaking that, “[i]n addition to promulgating this rule, the Copyright Office intends to prepare additional 
public resources regarding Pre-1972 Sound Recordings and the new noncommercial use exception, such as a public 
circular.” 84 Federal Register 14242, 14243 (April 9, 2019). 
92 The Office recorded the names of the parties with whom it met and published meeting summaries written by the 
parties on its website. https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/pre1972-soundrecordings-noncommercial/ex-parte-
communications.html 
93 17 USC 1401(c)(4)(B). 
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PRESCRIBED SEARCH STRATEGY 
Though the techniques used to conduct a good faith search might preferably be left to the skill of the 
individual conducting the search, the rule does prescribe required elements of a search. The rule 
requires that each search include the following elements: 
 
Required for all searches Title 
Featured artist(s) 
Required if known AND  
if the source has search 
capability  
Alternate name(s) and title(s)  
Album title 
International Standard Recording Code (ISRC) 
 
In the event that a Sec. 1401(c) usage is challenged by a rights holder, it seems very likely that the basis 
for that challenge will include the extent to which a search met the requirements for a good faith 
search. To the extent that a user is relying on the search rules outlined by this regulation, 
documentation of each of the searches of each element is advisable.  
 
GOOD FAITH SEARCH 
To satisfy the rule issued by the Copyright Office,94 the prospective user must perform one search in 
each of six (or, in some cases, seven) categories: 
 
 Category Permissible options 
1 U.S. Copyright Office The Copyright Office’s database of Pre-1972 Schedules 




3 Major Streaming Service (choose one) 




4 YouTube (for authorized uses only) youtube.com 
5 SoundExchange The SoundExchange ISRC database 
6 Amazon (physical availability) Amazon.com 
  
 
94 The rule can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, 37 C.F.R 201.37.  
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The rule requires an additional search in two special cases: 
 
• A user that has reason to believe that the recording is either classical or jazz95 must search one 
additional catalogue from the following list:  
o ArkivMusic  
o ArkivJazz 
o Classical Archives 
o Presto 
• For ethnographic native American (including native Alaskan) recordings, the user must 
contact both the holding institution (where appropriate, such as the library or archives) and 
the tribe to determine whether the recording is being commercially exploited.96 
 
Each of these steps is discussed, below.97 
 
a. Copyright Office’s searchable database 
One of the two statutory requirements for making use of Sec. 1401(c) is a search in the Copyright 
Office’s database of pre-1972 recordings. In order to be eligible for statutory damages or attorneys’ 
fees for infringement of Sec. 1401(a) protection, a recording’s rights holders must file information 
about their recording using a form provided by the Copyright Office.98 Those filings are entered into 
a searchable database, maintained on the Office’s website.99 If a recording is present in the database, 
it cannot be used under the Sec. 1401(c) provisions.  
 
The database is a useful research tool, but the statutory requirement to make use of the database is 
unfortunate. Rights holders may register their recordings whether or not they are currently making 
commercial use of them, and so the database doesn’t answer the question of whether a recording is 
being commercially exploited. The presence of a recording in the database does at least provide 
evidence that a rights holder has taken steps to protect their property, by allowing them to collect 
damages, but the recording may nonetheless be commercially unavailable in any form. Moreover, 
because there is no process by which entries expire and are removed when their commercial 
exploitation ceases, this problem will grow as the database ages and an increasing number of 
recordings that have been forgotten by their owners also have forgotten entries in the database. Rights 
holders may request that an entry be deleted, but only if the record was defective as submitted or the 
Copyright Office, in their discretion, accepts the request. In addition to the red tape, the $75 fee 
assessed for file removal further disincentivizes requesting removal. 100 
 
95 These are the only two niche genres specified. True niche genres not listed do not have additional specified requirements. 
96 To find contact information for a tribe, the rule directs users to the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Tribal Leaders Directory: 
https://www.bia.gov/tribal-leaders-directory  
97 It is worth noting that commercial availability does not always amount to commercial exploitation by the rights holder. 
Recordings that are being exploited overseas, even when doing so legally in their home country, may nonetheless not be 
available through any source authorized by the rights holders. The statute is clear that commercial exploitation “under the 
authority of the rights owner” is the condition necessary to disqualify use under Sec. 1401(c). This presumably means that 
unauthorized exploitation such as that described above do not serve to disqualify a use, if it can be shown that the 
availability is unauthorized, though users should tread cautiously. 
98 Regulations for filing that information are found in 37 C.F.R. 201.35. More information can be found, here: 
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/schedulefiling-instructions.html  
99 https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/search-soundrecordings.html  
100 The Office has stated that it “is open…to exploring the need and regulatory authority for…a renewal requirement for 
Pre-1972 Schedules (or NNUs) at a later date, perhaps in connection with periodic review of the search requirements 
promulgated under this rule.”  84 Federal Register 1661, 1664 note 53 (Feb. 5, 2019). 
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The statutory direction to include this step may mean a decrease in the usefulness of the safe harbor.  
However, because searching the Copyright Office’s database is required by the statute, it cannot be 
omitted from the process of conducting a good faith search. If a recording is found in the database, 
even if it is not otherwise being exploited, it is not eligible for use. Any recording that is not in the 
database may nonetheless be commercially exploited for purposes of this process, requiring additional 
searching. It is worth noting that infringement in any such recording is not subject to statutory 
damages or attorney’s fees unless the infringement occurs more than 90 days after the recording is 
indexed in the recording is indexed.101 
 
b. Search Engines 
Under the Copyright Office regulations one of three search engines—Google, Bing, or Yahoo—must 
be used to try to locate commercial use of a recording. The rule specifies that a user need only use one 
of those three search engines.  
 
Even searching in one search engine provides the opportunity for getting caught in a never-ending 
warren of search results. Recognizing this, the Copyright Office’s rulemaking clarifies that a search 
need only consider the first two pages of search results and that one need not conduct an extensive 
search in each of the links found. Rather, the Office states that in its opinion it is sufficient to read 
“the first 1–2 pages of results and [draw] reasonable inferences from those results, including following 
those links whose name or accompanying text suggest that commercial exploitation might be found 
there.”102 
 
c. Streaming services 
The third requirement in the Copyright Office’s search prescriptions is a search in one of four major 
music streaming platforms: Amazon, Apple, Spotify and TIDAL. As with the search engine 
requirement, the user need pick only one of those services when conducting the search. 
 
Sec. 1401(c) requires that a search be conducted in “services offering a comprehensive set of sound 
recordings for sale or streaming.” Given the statutory language, it is perhaps surprising that the rule 
directs a user to conduct a search in only one of four designated streaming services, since the 
catalogues of each service do not fully overlap. The Office justifies their decision by explaining that 
because most streaming services (including those not listed in this step) are indexed by search engines, 
the latter make searching in multiple streaming services’ databases unnecessary.  
 
This is fortunate, since unlike some streaming services, search engines are free to use without the 
creation of an account.103 On the other hand, because search engines index multiple streaming services, 
the requirement to search directly in one service after already consulting search engines seems 
redundant; perhaps in future rulemaking the Copyright Office will remove this step. In the meantime, 
those developing search protocols that do not rely on the Office’s prescription for good faith search 




101 17 U.S.C. 1401(f)(5)(A)(i). 
102 84 Federal Register 14245, using wording suggested by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
103 As of this writing, Apple Music does not allow searching their database without first creating an account.  
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Figure 2: Finding licensing metadata on YouTube 
d. YouTube 
Among content hosting platforms, the Copyright Office singled out YouTube as constituting a 
necessary stop in the search process. The Office’s discussion of the rule stipulates that the presence 
of authorized uses on YouTube is indicative of commercial exploitation. However, searching for 
commercial exploitation on YouTube presents special problems. Because the site’s content is entirely 
user-generated, it is not always obvious when the music on a given video actually constitutes an 
“authorized use.” During the rulemaking hearings, stakeholders debated the value of requiring a search 
on a site such as YouTube, and the Office’s findings are unsatisfying in many ways. Nonetheless, the 
Office did include searching in YouTube as a requirement for satisfying the rule. 
 
As the Office notes in their final rulemaking, many labels and other rights holders have entered into 
licensing agreements with YouTube that allow music to be performed on the service. Where music is 
licensed on a video, searchers may find that licensing information by clicking on the “show more” link 
























The Copyright Office’s rulemaking report states that, “If a user locates the use of a Pre-1972 Sound 
Recording and the ‘‘Show More’’ option indicates that the work has been licensed, the user should 
consider the sound recording being commercially exploited.”104 
 
One problem with this direction is that the licensing information provided does not distinguish 
between music rights and sound recording rights. For example, figure 2 shows that the content in 
one video of John Lennon’s Imagine is licensed to YouTube on behalf of more than two dozen rights 
holders. Without extra research, someone seeking to make a noncommercial use of the recording 
under Sec. 1401(c) would have no basis for knowing whether the licensing information refers to the 
 
104 84 Federal Register 14242, 14247 (April 9, 2019). 
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rights to the song, the recording, or both. In this case, because the rights are held by two different 
parties, this is an important detail. The metadata give no reason to assume that both the musical work 
and the recording are licensed, nor do they include any basis for making that determination. 
YouTube’s automation of the detection of copyrighted content, being imperfect, makes it entirely 
possible that a video will make unauthorized use of a recording while making authorized use of the 
underlying work. 
 
The Copyright Office does not provide guidance on how thorough a YouTube search must be to 
satisfy the requirement in this category. Presumably, the 1–2 page expectation of the search engine 
category is also sufficient here.  
 
e. SoundExchange 
The fifth stop in the Copyright Office rule is the SoundExchange ISRC database.105 Like the Copyright 
Office’s database, the ISRC database is a useful general research tool, but it is not well-suited for 
determining the commercial status of a recording. By contrast, consultation of the SoundExchange 
database is not a statutory requirement, and so it is only required where compliance with the Copyright 
Office Rule is desired. 
 
The International Standard Recording Code (ISRC) is the international standard identifier (ISO 3901) 
for sound recordings and music video recordings, comparable to the ISBN for books and the ISSN 
for serials.106 A recording’s ISRC is unique—it is normally assigned to a recording prior to release and 
remains associated with that recording permanently. Crucially for pre-1972 recordings, it can also be 
assigned retroactively, and is often done so prior to rereleases.107 
 
The SoundExchange database aims to make ISRC information available that previously was not 
accessible by the public.108 But just as ISBNs remain with their book in perpetuity, an ISRC remains 
associated with its recording long after the latter’s commercial value has dried up. The SoundExchange 
database does not make any attempt to maintain a representation of what recordings are currently 
being used by their rights holders—its goal appears to be to maintain as complete a database of ISRCs 
as possible. 
 
Data in the SoundExchange database come from rights holders. The presence of a recording’s listing 
in the database provides evidence that a recording was commercially exploited once, and possibly even 
that it has potential to be in the future. A negative result when searching the database would, to be 
sure, provide strong evidence that a recording is eligible for the noncommercial use safe harbor. 
However, because the database does not (for good reason) purge records of recordings that are not 
commercially available, it does not provide evidence of current commercial use. For many users, then, 
 
105 SoundExchange is the collective rights management organization designated to collect royalties from statutory licenses 
of sound recordings.  
106 The use of “ISRC” in the database name is somewhat misleading, since the use of the ISRC is governed by the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and the assigning agency for the USA is the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA), not SoundExchange. The database therefore does not have any official 
connection with the ISRC and so is not the registry of record for ISRCs issued, despite being featured on the IFPI’s 
website. See “Frequently Asked Questions,” https://isrc.soundexchange.com  
107 https://isrc.ifpi.org/en/using-isrc/when-to-assign  




the SoundExchange database may provide too many false positives to be useful in determining a 
recording’s eligibility. 
 
f. Physical availability 
The availability of a physical copy of a recording for sale or rental clearly indicates commercial 
exploitation. The Copyright Office requires a search of Amazon.com in order to satisfy this step.  
 
Note that Amazon provides sellers with the possibility of selling used copies of recordings, but the 
presence of used copies does not indicate commercial exploitation. Secondary markets cannot, by 
definition, be indicative of commercial activity on the part of a rights holder. The Copyright Office 
specifies that only new, unused copies should be considered for the purposes of determining whether 
a recording qualifies. 
 
Similarly, any new copies sold on Amazon that are not being sold under the authorization of the rights 
holder are not evidence of commercial exploitation. Since this is a difficult and sometimes impossible 
determination to make, though, it is a reasonable caution to assume that all new, unused copies on 
Amazon are authorized. 
 
CLASSICAL AND JAZZ RECORDINGS 
The physical search requirement is extended in cases of classical music and jazz. In cases where the 
user “reasonably believes” the work is work falls into one of these categories (deemed “niche genres”), 
a user must additionally search the catalogues of one additional seller. For jazz recordings, the 
prescribed seller is ArkivJazz, and for classical recordings the user may pick from one of: ArkivMusic, 
Classical Archives, or Presto. The rulemaking discussion does not address the areas where these genres 
overlap, either with each other or with other genres such as blues or gospel; presumably prudence 
dictates an inclusive understanding of the genres. 
 
g. Tribal recordings 
The Rule requires, in the case of recordings made by or of Alaska Native and American Indian tribes, 
that a good faith search include contacting the appropriate tribal organization. There are many ethical 
reasons for including this step when considering making use of these recordings, and the standards 
and codes of conduct established by professional organizations that interact with or curate the work 
of indigenous people address these reasons at length.109  
 
Legally, Sec. 1401(c) is concerned with the commercial nature of recordings, and there is nothing in 
the statute that suggests this step is essential to the statutory test of commercial exploitation. The steps 
that professional integrity would demand of a responsible librarian or archivist would likely exceed the 
requirements in this step, but in considering only the narrow question of commerciality, this step does 




109 See, for example, “Protocols for Native American Archival Materials.” http://www2.nau.edu/libnap-p/  
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3. Notice to the Copyright Office 
To make use of the Sec. 1401(c) safe harbor, users must, in addition to conducting the good faith 
search, file a Notice of Noncommercial Use (NNU) with the Copyright Office. Simplified, a NNU 
must describe the recording, the nature of the proposed use, and the length of time that it will be 
used.110 Forms for filing NNUs can be found on the Copyright Office’s website. In addition, the form 
requires the user to certify having conducted a good 
faith search within the requirements of the statute. 
 
The “dates of use” entry merits consideration, because 
the statute does not require that a noncommercial use 
be for a limited time. None of the Office’s regulations 
prescribe a maximum time period that a use may be made, nor do they make any provision for a ruling 
that a use is too long. Those making use of the noncommercial use safe harbor would be well-advised 
to err on the side of longer. Once the 90-day waiting period has elapsed, the use is fully protected and 
the rights holder may no longer opt out for the duration of the time period specified in the NNU, but 
once the proposed time expires, the user must re-file in order to gain protection. Users planning on 
using the Sec. 1401(c) provisions should choose an end date that safely exceeds the lifespan of the 
project. 
 
Currently, filing of NNUs must be done on a recording-by-recording basis, except where the 
recordings were originally released as part of the same album or other unit of publication. Uses 
involving multiple pre-1972 recordings will require multiple NNUs, along with multiple filing fees. As 
the current fee for filing a NNU is $50, this clearly will present a barrier for many potential users of 
Sec. 1401(c). In addition to the cost of performing searches, those planning on making use of the safe 
harbor will want to plan for the cost of filing fees for their use. 
 
4. 90-day waiting period 
Once the NNU is filed, the Copyright Office publishes the notice in an online, searchable public 
database.111 If, within ninety days of the NNU’s publication, the rights holder objects to the proposed 
use by filing an “opt-out” notice with the Copyright Office, then the safe harbor protections are not 
available. The rights holder does not need to give any reason for the objection. 
 
The statute demands that the good faith search must be made at some point before the end of this 
waiting period. However, the NNU form requires confirmation that the filer has already performed a 
good faith search at the time the NNU is filed. Though this is a contradiction, it appears unimportant, 





110 More detailed instructions are here: https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-
soundrecordings/NNUfiling-instructions.html  
111 As of this writing, the Office had not indexed any NNUs. Indexed NNUs will be available at this website: 
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/search-NNUs.html. 
The Copyright Office does not require 
documentation of a good faith search in 
the NNU. However, it is very advisable to 
retain screenshots and other evidence of a 
search in case it is challenged later. 
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Bottom line 
The noncommercial use provision has much in common with earlier attempts to create safe harbors 
for uses of orphan works, and also shares many of the failings of those attempts. The provision was 
introduced very late in the legislative process and the 
statute and subsequent rulemaking leave many 
unanswered questions. It is difficult to imagine that the 
provision will see wide-spread use. 
 
Librarians and archivists will almost never need to make 
use of the Sec. 1401(c) safe harbor, because the section 
108(h) exception (see part II.E, page 31) provides broader license to make use of the recordings and 
fewer requirements. The only case in which librarians or archivists should look to Sec. 1401(c) is for 
uses that are not eligible under Sec. 108(h). Creation of derivative works, for example, is not permitted 
under Sec. 108(h), but would be permitted under Sec. 1401(c). Likewise, Sec. 1401(c) should be used 
for purposes that cannot be tied somehow to preservation, scholarship, or research, though those 
criteria create such a broad umbrella that most library and archives uses would qualify. 
 
A non-librarian that needs explicit permission to make a noncommercial use might initially find this 
safe harbor provision attractive, though the individual would still have to license any underlying 
musical works that are not in the public domain. However, the use of 1401(c) requires a separate 
NNU—and its accompanying filing fee—for each recording. Any project that uses multiple recordings 
could quickly amass hundreds or thousands of dollars in filing fees, and those fees would be lost if the 
rights holder opts out.  
 
Sec. 1401(c) is aimed at noncommercial uses, so almost by definition many uses that would be available 
under Sec. 1401(c) might also be presumptively fair. Given the disincentives in filing fees and red tape, 
users may wish to consider relying on the Sec. 107 fair use exception, allowing the individual to make 
their use without the accompanying wasted funds, instead of Sec. 1401(c). However, in instances 
where Sec. 108(h) is not applicable and a fair use defense is either not supportable or desirable, this 
option might allow uses that otherwise cannot move forward. 
As with all other provisions of the 
CPAA, the Sec. 1401(c) safe harbor does 
not apply to any underlying works. Any 
underlying musical (or literary) works, if 
under copyright, would still need to be 
licensed or used under an exception. 
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G. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. Quasi-copyright nature of the CPAA 
Though similar, the provisions of the CPAA do not constitute copyright. The CPAA makes clear in 
the amended Sec. 301(c) that no pre-1972 sound recording is subject to copyright under Title 17. The 
CPAA overlaps significantly, but not entirely, with copyright. The similarities may cause confusion. 
For many purposes the laws are similar enough that there is no appreciable difference with copyright, 
but there are edge cases where the differences could prove significant. 
 
Strictly speaking, copyright is limited to those classes of works that fall within the scope of copyright 
as defined by sections 102–105 of the Copyright Act of 1976 as amended. Works within that scope 
are automatically incorporated into the full spectrum of copyright laws, including the exclusive rights 
in Secs 106 and 106A, limitations and exceptions (Secs. 107–122), formalities, damage provisions, 
trade restrictions, etc.  
 
Though the scope of works covered by copyright is very broad, it is not all-inclusive. In recent years 
Congress has identified some classes of works that they determine need some form of protection, but 
rather than simply bringing them into the copyright system they have created special protection that 
apply some, but not all of the copyright laws. These special laws are found in individual chapters of 
Title 17, and they incorporate other parts of the Copyright Act only to the extent that they do so 
explicitly. The CPAA creates one such chapter, found in 17 USC 1401.112 
 
Another example, found in 17 U.S.C. sec. 1101, is helpful as an illustration. Sec. 1101 addresses 
unauthorized recording of musical performances. A prerequisite of copyright is that, to be protected, 
a work must be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.” Recordings of performances are, of 
course, a tangible medium, but performances themselves consist of unfixed sounds, and so are outside 
the scope of copyright. Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (URAA), federal law did 
not restrict recording of live musical performances, except to the extent that copyrighted works were 
being performed. A public performance of, say, the Sonata no. 3 in F-minor by Johannes Brahms, 
could be recorded by a member of the audience without infringing any rights the performer had under 
federal law. Performers enjoyed protection against the creation of bootleg recordings only to the 
extent that those protections existed under the common law or state statutes.  
 
The URAA created a new chapter in Title 17 that introduced federal protection against the creation 
of unauthorized fixations of live musical performances.113 Sec. 1101 prohibits creation of, or 
 
112 In addition to pre-1972 recordings, similar quasi-copyright chapters exist for semiconductor chips (Ch. 9), musical 
performances (Ch. 11), and vessel hull designs (Ch. 13). 
113 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.L. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809, enacted December 8, 1994. 
• The CPAA provisions are similar to, but not the same as copyright. 
• State laws may still affect the protection and use of pre-1972 recordings. 
• CPAA application to recordings made outside the United States is unclear. 
• The CPAA attempts to remove sovereign immunity, but recent litigation probably 
supersedes and invalidates that provision. 
• The CPAA appears not to provide for criminal infringement. 
• Bootleg recordings are not subject to any of the CPAA’s exceptions. 
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trafficking in, recordings that are made without the consent of the performers, and subjects violators 
to the damage provisions found in Secs. 502–505 “to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.”114 
Structurally, this wording means that bootleg recordings are not copyright infringement, though the 
penalties for infringing Sec. 1101 are similar. However, though works under copyright are subject to 
the full range of copyright law in chapters 1–8, sec. 1101 constitutes the entire law governing bootleg 
recordings except where explicitly stated otherwise. Practically, this means that bootleg recordings 
enjoy much stricter protection than copyrighted works. Among other differences, there is no limit to 
the term of protection nor any statute of limitations, they are not subject to the limitations and 
exceptions that copyrighted works are, and there is no requirement to register in order to pursue 
damages. 
 
The CPAA creates similarly independent provisions for pre-1972 recordings, found in 17 USC 1401. 
Congress could simply have retroactively extended copyright to pre-1972 recordings, in which case all 
of the provisions in chapters 1–8 would have applied and the state laws would have been fully 
preempted. Among other things, this would mean that the authorship rules, registration requirements, 
and copyright termination provisions would also apply. Instead, the Act preempts some parts of the 
state laws, leaving the remainder in place, and replaces those preempted sections with federal 
provisions that are cherry picked from the copyright system.115 The result is that Sec. 1401 constitutes 
the entirety of federal law governing pre-1972 sound recordings. The federal laws governing 
copyrighted works apply to pre-1972 recordings only as explicitly provided for in Sec. 1401. 
 
2. Relationship to state laws 
Though the CPAA federalized the protection of pre-1972 sound recordings, the Act did not fully 
remove the oversight states have over the recordings. State laws, though greatly weakened, will still 
play a role in understanding pre-1972 sound recordings as intellectual property. 
 
STATES MAY CREATE TERRESTRIAL BROADCAST RIGHTS 
One important exception to the CPAA’s preemption of state laws is in the area of terrestrial broadcast. 
Under federal law, the exclusive right to perform a work publicly applies to sound recordings only in 
the case of digital transmissions. Analog performances, such as those made through AM/FM radio 
broadcasts, are non-infringing. Under the CPAA, it appears states may elect to create exclusive rights 
for analog broadcast transmissions.116 Currently, no states have done so. If and when they do, a 
recording’s protections may not extend past the expiration of their CPAA protection. 
 
STATE LAWS CONTINUE TO DEFINE OWNERSHIP 
Federal copyright law specifies that the “author” of a work is the initial owner of the copyright in that 
work.117 State laws, by contrast, do not have uniform language or even a unifying principle defining 
the owner of a sound recording.118 The CPAA does not address ownership of rights in pre-1972 
recordings, except to say that the party that owned the rights to a recording prior to the Act continued 
 
114 A related provision in 18 USC 2319A creates criminal penalties for unauthorized recordings. 
115 17 U.S.C. 1401(f)(6)(A): “…[N]o provision of this title shall apply to or limit the remedies available under this section 
except as otherwise provided in this section.” 
116 17 U.S.C 301(c) “Nothing in this subsection may be construed to affirm or negate the preemption of rights and remedies 
pertaining to any cause of action arising from the non-subscription broadcast transmission of sound recordings under the 
common law or statutes of any State for activities that do not qualify as covered activities under chapter 14…” 
117 17 U.S.C. 201. 
118 This is not to say that federal law is clear on the matter. The meaning of the term, “author,” in the context of sound 
recordings is at best ambiguous; however, that question is beyond the scope of this document. 
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to own them after enactment.119 For most commercial recordings this will not present an issue, since 
ownership of most commercial recordings is defined by a contract. However, for all other recordings, 
the ownership is determined by the state copyright laws as they existed on October 10, 2020. 
 
State laws use a variety of different theories for determining ownership. Most states employ the 
principle that the owner of the recording is the owner of the sounds contained in the recording (without 
defining who it is that owns them). Some states employ the otherwise obsolete principle that 
ownership of the rights follows ownership of the physical object (in this case, the master recording).120 
Some states additionally provide for ownership by the person who owns the rights to record or to 
authorize the recording of a live performance.”121 Based on these differences, it is possible that at as 
many as three different parties could claim ownership to a given recording depending on the state. 
Though the CPAA federalized how sound recordings could be subject to royalties, it did not resolve 
who could collect them if there is disagreement. 
 
3. Pre-1972 recordings made outside the United States 
Prior to the MMA, not all pre-1972 recordings were ignored by federal copyright. As part of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Congress retroactively granted, or “restored,” copyright 
protection to works that had been in the public domain as a consequence of their national origin.122 
Eligible pre-1972 recordings that were restored have been subject to federal law since the URAA went 
into effect, on December 8, 1994. The CPAA and URAA contradict each other, leaving an open 
question as to which takes precedence. 
 
To be restored under the URAA, as codified in Sec. 104A, a work needed to meet each of the following 
conditions: 
 
1. The work was not in the public domain in its country of origin; 
2. The work was “in the public domain in the United States” for one or more reasons, 
which include “lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound recordings fixed 
before February 15, 1972;”123 
3. The work had at least one author who was a national or domiciliary of an eligible 
country; and 
4. The source country was a signatory of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT). 
 
Any recording that met each of those conditions on the date the URAA went into effect was 
automatically fully covered by federal copyright.  
 
 
119 17 U.S.C. 1401(l)(2)(A). 
120 Those states are: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and possibly the District of Columbia. See Eric J. Harbeson, "Online 
Access to Institutional Recordings: An Analysis of Copyright Issues" (Thesis: C.A.S., University of Illinois, 2012), p. 37, 
fn 87. Paper available: http://scholar.colorado.edu/amrc_facpapers/2  
121 Specifically: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode 
Island, and Virginia. Id. at 38, fn. 89. 
122 17 U.S.C. 104A. 
123 Strictly speaking, pre-1972 recordings were never in the public domain, since protection under the various state laws is 
not dependent on place of origin; however, Congress’s intention to bring those recordings under federal copyright seems 
clear, despite this apparent oversight. 
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The URAA’s copyright restoration creates a problem for interpreting the CPAA. Prior to the MMA, 
the text in Sec. 301(c) that “no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to 
copyright under this title” was already in contradiction with the restoration provision in Sec. 104A, 
though the problem appears to have been largely academic. With the introduction of Sec. 1401, the 
contradictions have expanded, and so have their significance. 
 
The problem is that Sec. 1401 creates user rights that do not exist elsewhere in Title 17. As discussed 
above, the provisions of the CPAA run parallel to—but are not a part of—copyright. In recordings 
with restored copyrights, those provisions overlap. It is not clear how the parallel provisions interact 
with each other.124 
 
A useful example is the application of library and archives exceptions. As discussed above, sec. 108(h) 
provides libraries and archives broad rights to reproduce, distribute, and perform works that are in 
their last 20 years of copyright if they are not being commercially exploited. Any published pre-1978 
works that are still under copyright currently have a copyright term of 95 years from publication, and 
so sec. 108(h) applies to works more than 75 years old. Under Sec. 104A, restored pre-1972 sound 
recordings are subject to the same copyright as other copyrighted works, so the same rules apply. 
However, Sec. 1401 applies the Sec. 108(h) language to all pre-1972 recordings.  
 
The question, then, is how to resolve the contradiction for pre-1972 recordings that are less than 75 
years old. In 2021, libraries may apply Sec. 108(h) only to works other than recordings that were 
published before 1946, but under Sec. 1401, they may also apply the statute to all recordings fixed 
before February 15, 1972. May a library apply Sec. 108(h) to restored recordings fixed between 1946 
and 1972? 
 
Because foreign pre-1972 recordings have had full copyright protection, they have been limited to a 
95-year copyright term; however, most pre-1972 recordings have longer protection under Sec. 1401(a). 
For example, recordings from 1947–56 have an effective protection term of 110 years from 
publication. Do foreign recordings from that era now have an additional 15 years of protection after 
their copyright expires? 
 
The section 1401(c) provision creates a safe harbor for what amount to abandoned works; however, 
the Copyright Act has no equivalent provision for the use of those works. Will someone who makes 
use of a restored recording under Sec. 1401(c) be protected from litigation under this statute, or will 
that person still be liable for copyright infringement claims? 
 
There is unfortunately no language in the statutes or elsewhere that provides definitive answers to 
these questions. During the U.S. Copyright Office’s rulemaking hearings for the noncommercial use 
provisions in Sec. 1401(c), stakeholders debated the question, but the Office declined to provide an 
interpretation, saying only that “prospective users of foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings should 
 
124 See, for example, 84 Federal Register 1661, 1670 (Feb. 5, 2019). “Section 1401 provides sui generis protection running 
parallel to any copyright protection afforded to foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings under section 104A. While section 
1401(c) operates as a limitation on the protection available under that new chapter, it does not explicitly limit title 17 
copyright protection for certain foreign restored works (i.e., copyright protection under section 104A). Whether the 
noncommercial use exception under section 1401(c) can immunize content actionable under title 17 for restored works 
that are foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings may ultimately be a matter for the courts to resolve.” 
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proceed cautiously before relying on the [section 1401 exceptions].”125 Unless and until the question 
is litigated, this is likely the best guidance that we will have. 
 
Because Sec. 108(h) and Sec. 1401(c) only apply to recordings that are not currently being 
commercially exploited, this question is unlikely to be litigated because the nature of the properties 
involved means they are unlikely to be valuable enough to merit the effort. However, institutions that 
are risk averse, or anyone relying on a recording’s public domain status would do well to consider the 
question. If, in the end, courts rule that the Sec. 1401 exceptions do not apply to foreign recordings, 
then it is very likely that a strong fair use defense will be available. Institutions or individuals that are 
uncomfortable applying fair use may wish to give extra thought to their use of pre-1972 recordings 
whose copyright has been restored under Sec. 104A. 
 
4. Sovereign Immunity 
The CPAA includes language subjecting states to infringement claims. However, similar language 
elsewhere in the Copyright Act has been struck down by the Supreme Court in March 2020, and so 
the CPAA’s language may presumably be ignored, at least for now. Many sound recordings collections 
are under the aegis of state institutions, and for those institutions the availability of the sovereign 
immunity defense has been an important failsafe in making copyright decisions.  
 
The Eleventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects states from lawsuits brought by citizens 
of other states, while longstanding legal precedent extends that protection to include legal action 
brought by a state’s own citizens.126 However, the state’s immunity is not absolute. Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can, under the right circumstances, enact legislation that would 
allow nonconsenting states to be sued by citizens. 
 
The CPAA attempts to create a new condition for states to be sued. The Act states that “anyone” who 
commits an unauthorized act is liable for monetary damages in line with copyright infringement, and 
Sec. 1401(a)(3) subsequently defines “anyone” to include: 
 
…any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State 
acting in the official capacity of the officer or employee, as applicable.127 
 
The clear intention is that states are liable for infringement of the CPAA. That understanding is 
reinforced later, in Sec. 1401(k), which makes clear that states are subject to the provisions as would 
be any nongovernmental entity. The Copyright Remedies Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA),128 found 
in 17 U.S.C sec. 511, also attempted to place copyright liability on the states but has been struck down 




125 U. S. Copyright Office. “Noncommercial Use of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings That Are Not Being Commercially 
Exploited: Final Rule.” 84 Federal Register 14251 (April 9, 2019). The notice continues, “The Office will provide general 
guidance in its [Notice of Noncommercial Use] form instructions regarding the noncommercial use exception and the 
parallel protection afforded to certain foreign sound recordings, including how to search the Office’s records to determine 
whether a particular Pre-72 Sound Recording is a restored work under section 104A.” 
126 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
127 17 U.S.C. 1401(a)(3). 
128 Copyright Remedies Clarification Act, Pub. L. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990). 
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Congress may deny states’ sovereign immunity if two conditions are met. First, Congress must “enact 
unequivocal statutory language,” explicitly declaring their intention to do so, and second, they must 
have a constitutional basis for their action.129 In Allen v. Cooper, the Court held that Congress’s 
constitutional authority to create copyright laws is not a valid basis for abrogating states’ sovereign 
immunity.130 The Court also rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
taking of property without compensation (as extended to the states in the Fourteenth Amendment) 
formed a valid constitutional basis. 
 
For the Fifth Amendment argument to succeed, Congress must show a proportional response to 
either an existing problem or a problem that is likely to present itself. 131 In striking down the CRCA, 
the Court found that Congress was presented with evidence of neither—rather, the evidence suggested 
that states are generally good actors where copyright is concerned and, as such, are unlikely to engage 
in piratical behavior.132 In short, because there was no evidence of an existing problem of states 
abusing their authority, the Court found that Congress had exceeded their authority in enacting the 
legislation. 
 
The CPAA does not appear to be based on any more evidence of wrongdoing by the states than was 
the CRCA. As of this writing, the Copyright Office is studying the question of whether copyright 
owners are experiencing excessive infringements by states, and the results of that study may affect the 
validity of Sec. 1401(a)(3) in light of Allen.133 The CPAA’s language may also fail under the 
“unequivocal language” requirement, in that unlike the CRCA, the CPAA does not explicitly state that 
it is abrogating the Eleventh Amendment. But at least until the Copyright Office study is released, it 
seems likely that the sovereign immunity language in the CPAA may be safely ignored.  
 
5. Criminal infringement 
The CPAA does not provide for criminal infringement of its protections. Though federal copyright 
includes both civil and criminal penalties, the CPAA does not apply the criminal provisions as defined 
in 17 U.S.C. 506. As a result, pre-1972 recordings are only the second class of works—the other being 
vessel hull designs—that are not protected by criminal statutes. 
 
This omission creates a complete reversal of the state of protection of pre-1972 recordings. Prior to 
the CPAA’s enactment, most of the state statutes that addressed pre-1972 recordings were exclusively 
criminal in nature, being primarily a response to systematic commercial record piracy.134 By some 
 
129 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996). 
130 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999). 
131 Allen, 140 S.Ct. at 1004: “an infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within the reach of the Due 
Process Clause. And more: A State cannot violate that Clause unless it fails to offer an adequate remedy for an 
infringement, because such a remedy itself satisfies the demand of “due process.” (internal citations omitted). See also, 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) “Congress’ enforcement 
power is remedial." 
132 Allen, 140 S.Ct. at 1006: “Indeed, [then Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman] opined: ‘They are all respectful of the 
copyright law’ and ‘will continue to respect the law’; what State, after all, would ‘want to get a reputation as a copyright 
pirate?’” 
133 “Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and request for public comment.” 85 Federal Register 34252 (3 June 2020). After an 
extension, the comment period closed on October 22, 2020, with public round tables expected at a later date. 
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/ 
134 California was the exception, having both criminal and civil statutes in place. Indiana and Vermont did not have record 
piracy statutes in place at all. “State Criminal Laws: Pre-1972 Sound Recordings.” 
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/20111212_survey_state_criminal_laws_ARL_CO_v2.pdf 
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accounts, this form of infringement—and the need to preserve the state laws punishing it—was a 
primary motivation for Congress’s decision not to make the Sound Recordings Act retroactive in the 
first place.135 Congress has always been concerned with criminal infringement, and the recording 
industry, whose lobbying heavily contributed to winning passage of the MMA, even more so. One 
might well wonder at whether the decision to omit criminal provisions was deliberate.  
 
Whether deliberate or intentional, the impact is likely minimal on sound recordings collections and 
their curators, since criminal copyright infringement requires willfulness, commercial intent, and scale 
that is vanishingly rare in that community. However, it is worth making note of the change if only 
because of its remarkable nature. Congress has never before removed criminal penalties from the 
copyright landscape. More importantly, prior to CPAA criminal statutes were the only laws one could 
turn to for guidance on pre-1972 recordings in most states, and the exceptions for non-commercial 
activity were inconsistent at best. Now, the entire landscape is governed only by civil law.136 
 
6. Bootleg recordings 
The CPAA applies to all pre-1972 sound recordings (except perhaps, as discussed above, foreign 
recordings), and the URAA’s bootleg laws (also discussed in part II.G.1, page 43) apply to all music 
recordings whose fixation was unauthorized. Pre-1972 bootlegs, it follows, are subject to both laws. 
However, since the protections exist independently of each other, the URAA’s more stringent 
protection largely supersedes the CPAA with respect to these recordings. 
 
As discussed above, unauthorized, or bootleg recordings occupy a quasi-copyright space in the law 
that is similar to that created for pre-1972 recordings by the CPAA. Section 1101 (and a parallel 
criminal statute in 18 U.S.C. 2319A) prohibits, among other things, reproducing or trafficking in 
unauthorized recordings of musical performances. There are no term limits on the protection,137 and 
there are no statutory exceptions.138 
 
Reproduction and distribution are also covered activities under the CPAA. However, though one 
might hope that its flexibility might provide some moderation to the bootleg laws, this is not the case. 
Because the laws are self-contained, the limitations and exceptions discussed elsewhere in this 
document apply only to the protections described in Sec. 1401(a). Even where the CPAA might 
otherwise allow for use of unauthorized recordings, those allowances do not extend to the similarly 
siloed prohibitions of Sec. 1101. Therefore, though the CPAA might provide for uses of pre-1972 
bootleg recordings, the URAA’s prohibition takes precedence. 
 
 
135 See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.10(B)(1)(a)(i). 
136 An important exception to this is bootleg recordings, discussed earlier (II.G.1, page 43 and in the next section. 
137 Though Sec. 1101 appears to violate the “limited times” requirement in the Constitution, the statute has survived 
challenge based on the argument that performances are unfixed and therefore not “writings” under the meaning of the 
Copyright Clause. See Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions, 405 F.Supp.2d 1169 (C.D. Cal, 2005), finding the statute 
is constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 
138 It is likely that the First Amendment requires some amount of room for fair use, though the courts have not yet 
considered this question; however, any fair use discussion would be based solely in common law, and would not necessarily 
follow the contours of cases surrounding the statutory fair use provision. See Craig W. Dallon, “The Anti-Bootlegging 
Provisions: Congressional power and Constitutional limitations,” Vanderbilt Journal or Entertainment and Technology Law 13/2 
(Winter, 2011), 255–321 at 319: “Strong historical precedent supports a fair use defense. Fair use under copyright law was 
a common law doctrine, recognized by the courts for over a century, before Congress finally codified it in the Copyright 
Act of 1976. Similarly, fair use has long been a fundamental part of trademark law. The courts, likewise, should find a fair 
use defense for the anti-bootlegging provisions.” 
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It is worth noting that the URAA’s bootleg prohibitions apply only to recordings of musical 
performances. Unauthorized recordings of literary works, such as poetry readings, would not fall 
under Sec. 1101, and therefore if fixed before Feb. 15, 1972 would be exclusively the subject of the 
CPAA.
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TITLE III: ALLOCATIONS FOR MUSIC PRODUCERS ACT 
 
Owners of rights to sound recordings (including, with the passage of the CPAA, pre-1972 recordings) 
have the exclusive right to authorize public performances of their works by digital transmission. That 
exclusive right is subject to two statutory licenses. Section 114 provides for a statutory license that is 
available to digital music services that broadcast music on a noninteractive basis (i.e., services where 
the user does not control what works are streamed) via cable, internet, or satellite networks. Sec. 112 
provides an additional license that allows making ephemeral copies of the sound recordings for 
purposes of making use of the Sec. 114 license. 
 
The licenses are managed by SoundExchange, a nonprofit collective management organization which 
was designated under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 as the “nonprofit collective” 
responsible for collecting and distributing royalties from payment of licenses.139 SoundExchange 
distributes the royalties under a statutorily prescribed formula: 50% of receipts are paid to the owner 
of the rights in the sound recording, and 45% are paid to the “recording artists or featured artists.” 
Two designated agents are respectively charged with distributing payments among nonfeatured 
instrumental musicians and nonfeatured singers. Each of these is allocated 2½% of the royalties. 
 
In its music licensing study, the Copyright Office noted that “record producers—who make valuable 
creative contributions to sound recordings—are not among the parties entitled by statute to direct 
payment by SoundExchange.”140 Instead, the report continues, producers’ contracts with one of the 
four statutorily designated parties form the basis of their royalties, and the producer is paid by that 
party out of royalties received. In some such cases, the parties have given written direction to 
SoundExchange to issue payments directly to the producers rather than indirectly through the 
statutory party (normally the featured artist).141 
 
The AMP Act codifies this existing practice, formally directing SoundExchange to accept “letters of 
direction” from rights holders, allowing for direct royalty payments to producers, recording engineers, 
and mixers (collectively, “producers”). In addition, in the case of recordings fixed prior to November 
1, 1995, the Act allows for producers to request payments in the absence of a letter of direction. In 
those cases, the producer makes a request to SoundExchange, which then attempts to contact the 
appropriate sound recording rights holder. If the rights holder does not object to the request within a 
specified timeframe, SoundExchange implements the payments. 
 
The AMP Act ultimately has minimal impact on sound recordings collections. However, the Act may 
affect members of the larger sound recordings community, especially those who made creative 
technical contributions to recordings from before 1995.
 
139 Small Webcasters Settlement Act, Pub. L. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, enacted Dec. 4, 2002. 
 https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ321/PLAW-107publ321.pdf  
140 Copyright and the Music Marketplace, 7. 
141 Copyright and the Music Marketplace, 47–48. 
• Codifies an informal practice for issuing direct payments to producers. 
• Expands the practice for producers of recordings fixed before 1995. 
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CASE STUDY:  
DISTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL SOUND RECORDINGS142 
 
To illustrate how the various pieces of the Music Modernization Act might be employed in practice, 
the following case study considers large sound archives. As was documented in The State of Recorded 
Sound Preservation in the United States, libraries and archives hold significant collections of audio material, 
a large portion of which might be considered endangered and in need of preservation. Circulating 
collections might be concentrated on published recordings on compact disc or 12-inch grooved discs, 
whereas archival recordings might include a mix of unpublished and published recordings on any of 
more than a dozen different formats that have been used in the more than 150 years since the first 
sound recordings appeared. Recordings found in archives might be individual recordings lightly 
scattered among boxes of primarily paper collections, or they may be focused collections consisting 
of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of recordings.143 
 
Preservation of sound recordings is costly and time-consuming even before considering the legal 
ramifications. Rights issues have magnified that burden; however, the MMA improves the position of 
these institutions in two important ways. First, preservation projects depend on the confidence of 
administrators and granting agencies that a given project is compliant with the law and will not 
introduce liability. The MMA removes some of the vagaries that, in the past, may have caused cautious 
decision makers to defer audio preservation. Second, the MMA’s provisions, in some cases, enable 
collection-level decisions, reducing the need for costly (and often wasteful) item-level rights tracking. 
 
How might audio preservation be carried out differently, under the MMA? The answer depends (as it 
did prior to the MMA) principally on the intended end result.  
 
Greatly simplified, audio preservation requires digital reproduction of a sound recording, after which 
the reproduction is made available to the public in some form. Each recording will generally implicate 
at least two sets of rights: those of the recording itself, and those of the work that comprises the 
recording.144 The latter might involve a literary work such as a poem, a play, an interview, etc., but 
most will be musical works. For each of these two works—the sound recording and the underlying 
work—preservation activities affect as many as three different rights which the author or rights holder 
has the exclusive right to authorize. Those rights are the right to reproduce the work, and either or 
both of the right to distribute and the right to publicly perform the work.  
 
Preservation activities, then, create numerous opportunities for infringement. Every reformatted or 
migrated recording introduces at least two possible counts (more if best practices for additional safety 
and access copies are followed) and every distribution or performance of the performance adds at 
least two more. Decision-making at the item level presents intractable time requirements in large 
 
142 As with the rest of this document, this case study is not intended as legal advice but as an aid in framing the decision-
making process in light of the new laws. Readers are urged to consult qualified legal counsel before moving forward with 
a project. 
143 For example, the Marr Sound Archives at the University of Missouri–Kansas City holds “over 380,000 items…[on] a 
wide range of audio formats including LPs, 78s, 45s, cylinders, transcription discs, instantaneous-cut discs, open reel tapes, 
CDs, and digital audio files.” https://library.umkc.edu/marr/about  
144 In the case of musical performances, the performers have rights independent of the recording, as discussed in the 
section on bootleg recordings, part II.G.6, page 49. For purposes of this case study, it is assumed that those rights were 
not infringed in the making of the recording. 
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collections. A large-scale project requires an approach that minimizes the number of analyses that 
need to be conducted and decisions to be made. 
 
Case: academic music recordings 
Goal: preservation, accessible on institutional scholarship repository 
A common situation for many academic institutions is the presence of large collections of recordings 
generated in the day-to-day business of colleges, schools, and departments of music. These recordings 
may include recitals, some of which are given in partial fulfillment of degrees, curricular ensemble 
performances, guest lectures and performances, or stage performances of operas or musicals. 
Collections of such recordings may extend over decades, and exist typically on formats associated with 
master recordings, such as open reel tapes, digital audio tapes, or compact discs.  
 
The unique nature of these recordings, combined with the vulnerability of the formats, may make 
recordings such as these high priorities for preservation. As the recordings form a historical record of 
scholarship at the institution (in some cases forming the equivalent of written theses and dissertations), 
a library or archives holding the recordings may wish to deposit the recordings in an online institutional 
scholarship repository. Since many institutional repositories are not capable of designating levels of 
access, the recordings might need to be made available to the public on an unrestricted basis. 
 
There are many ways one might approach this problem. This analysis will consider the sound 
recordings and musical works separately, attempting to identify ways in which the MMA simplifies or 
better enables the process.145 
 
SOUND RECORDINGS 
Turning first to the rights in the sound recordings, an archivist might seek a single theory that would 
allow all uses. One theory to consider is the possibility that the institution is either the owner or joint 
owner of the rights in the recording. Were that the case, the institution would have unrestricted use 
of the sound recordings.146 There are a number of theories that might support this conclusion, 
including the institution as “producer” of the recording, the “work made for hire” doctrine, or even 
ownership of the physical master recordings. Unfortunately, the law does not make clear where the 
rights in a sound recording lie in the absence of the contracts that normally form a part of the 
commercial recording process. Federal law gives little to no guidance. The CPAA specifies that the 
owner of a pre-1972 sound recording is the party who owned the rights prior to passage of the Act, 
and so is based on one more applicable state laws. An institution that determines it owns all the sound 
recording rights need look no further for permission; however, this is a subtle question and one with 




145 This document only considers copyright issues. Other potential legal issues, such as privacy and publicity rights 
(especially for celebrity musicians) and students’ rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, are beyond 
the scope of this document, but would also demand consideration. 
146 Under U.S. Copyright Law, each joint owner has a fully independent right to use or to license others to use the work. 
The only responsibility each owner has to the others is to account for any profits from the use of the work. H.R. Rep. 94-
1476 at 121. 
147 See Eric J. Harbeson, "Ownership in Institutional Sound Recordings." Paper presented: International Federation of 
Library Associations, Helsinki, Finland, August 14, 2012. Paper available:  
http://scholar.colorado.edu/amrc_facpapers/3/  
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Another usage theory that could apply to all proposed uses of the sound recordings is the fair use 
doctrine, Sec. 107. Here, the archivist would consider the four statutory factors that courts use to 
make fair use determinations. As with the ownership theory, fair use depends on the risk tolerance of 
the institution and a careful and informed judgment. A fair use analysis is not within the scope of this 
document, though the noncommercial nature of the recordings and the fact that they are unpublished 
and generally have low commercial value would all undoubtedly factor in. Very importantly, the CPAA 
newly ensures that consideration of fair use is valid for all recordings in the collection, including pre-
1972 recordings. 
 
If neither the fair use nor ownership theories are applicable, then the archivist needs to consider 
recordings in smaller groups. The next step might be to consider the recordings in two groups—those 
recorded on or after February 15, 1972 and those recorded before. 
 
Pre-1972 sound recordings 
With pre-1972 sound recordings, the archivist looks to the provisions of Sec. 1401. This is where one 
of the greatest benefits of the MMA is seen. The archivist turns first to Sec. 1401(f), which applies the 
Sec. 108 library and archives exceptions to the protection of pre-1972 recordings. Sec. 108(h) allows 
qualifying libraries and archives to reproduce, distribute, and perform published, copyrighted works 
“for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research,” when they are in the last twenty years of their 
copyright term, provided that the works are not subject to commercial exploitation and are not 
available at a reasonable price. Sec. 1401(f) expands that provision by applying it to all pre-1972 sound 
recordings, whether or not they are “published.”  
 
The archivist easily determines that the pre-1972 institutional recordings are not subject to normal 
commercial exploitation and are not available at any price (except, of course, by contacting the 
institution itself). The publication status of the recordings might be debatable, but in this case the law 
applies regardless. The archivist determines that the institutional repository is provided expressly for 
research and scholarship purposes. The law allows for reproduction, distribution and public 
performance—all of the potential rights that the process might infringe. As a result, the archivist 
determines that the law fully allows the institution to make the desired use of the sound recording 
itself. For those recordings, all that remains is to determine the legal issues surrounding the underlying 
musical works. 
 
The simplicity and reliability of this determination under the MMA stands in stark contrast to the legal 
landscape it replaced. Prior to passage of the CPAA, the archivist would have to have considered 
relevant state laws where preservation copies were concerned, and for distribution possibly all of the 
state laws (because the online distribution creates potential infringement in every state). There was a 
high probability that fair use was available under state laws, but it was by no means certain how the 
law would have applied and whether the state courts would have followed the federal precedents. 
 
Copyrighted (post-1972) sound recordings 
For works that are fully subject to federal copyright—all pre-1972 recordings as well as foreign 
recordings whose copyright was restored by the URAA—the determination is not as straight forward. 
The MMA did not change any of the laws affecting protection of copyrighted sound recordings, and 
so the process is no different than it would have been prior to passage of the act. 
 
For copyrighted sound recordings, there is no single unifying provision that can be applied. As such, 
the archivist might re-examine an ownership theory. One might create high level groupings of 
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recordings which the institution probably owns and those where it is less certain; for example, the 
archivist might argue that curricular ensembles, as works for hire, are almost certainly at least joint 
works (with the institution as one author), whereas by contrast a solo piano recital might be the sole 
property of the performer. This would allow the archivist to reduce the quantity of recordings 
requiring more detailed attention.  
 
The archivist might determine whether in recent years some of the recordings are subject to 
agreements or other contracts—which some institutions require their students to sign upon 
matriculation—that grant the institution privileges that might include distribution of recordings. In 
addition, even if the institution was uncomfortable relying on fair use for the entirety of a project, they 
might reconsider whether fair use could be applied to any of the remaining items. Systems that do 
provide for different levels of access might make for more favorable fair use arguments. The archivist 
in this case might consider whether the risk to the collections of not proceeding outweighs any risk of 
a rights holder complaint, especially if precautions such as take-down mechanisms are put in place.  
 
Regardless, the federal Sec. 108 exceptions still apply. No post-1972 recordings can be considered in 
the last 20 years of their copyright term (the earliest that will happen is 2047), so the “last twenty 
years” provision in Sec. 108(h) is not available. However, Sec. 108 does nonetheless provide for 
reproduction for the purposes of preservation (as does, almost certainly, the fair use exception), and 
also for making those recordings available on the premises of the institution.148  
 
MUSICAL WORKS 
All of the recordings in the hypothetical collection of institutional recordings contain musical works. 
For the archivist working to move institutional recordings online, sound recordings are in many ways 
the easier of the two classes of works to manage. The recordings under consideration here generally 
do not have any particular market value, so it is reasonable to focus on ways that the project may 
proceed without permission. The CPAA encourages this through its unprecedented library exceptions.  
 
The musical works contained in the recording are, by contrast, likely to consist of highly valuable 
commercial products. Where the rights in noncommercial, archival sound recordings do not, and likely 
cannot form a significant source of income to the rights holders, public performance rights form a 
major source of revenue for the authors of musical works. Because of this, the archivist may find that, 
instead of looking for permission-free solutions, the safer path is focusing on how the works may be 
provided under license. 
 
This is not to say that looking at a fair use defense is impossible. As with sound recordings, provision 
of access to copyrighted musical works is subject to the limitations and exceptions in the Copyright 
Act, including fair use. The merits of a fair use argument in this scenario are outside the scope of this 
document; however, they would need to be weighed carefully, especially in light of the commercial 
value of the works and the existing markets for licensing them. 
 
Prior to the MMA, licensing of musical works was possibly the biggest obstacle to the success of a 
project such as this. Being an interactive service under the law’s definitions, providing access through 
an online repository by permission required the institution to seek licenses on a work-by-work basis. 
Scaled to many thousands of recordings, this could be prohibitive for many institutions. The existence 
of a statutory blanket license for digital delivery of musical works, under the Musical Works 
 
148 17 U.S.C. 108(b)–(c). 
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Modernization Act, simplifies the situation considerably. The new Sec. 115 license provides the 
authorizations needed for institutions to make recordings of copyrighted musical works available in a 
repository setting, provided that the institution is capable of providing the necessary reports to the 
Music Licensing Collective.  
 
One potential obstacle for some recordings is the requirement that the initial recording have been 
made under the authority of the musical work’s copyright owner.149 For the most part, institutional 
recordings of the sort discussed here are created as documentary records of a performance, without 
intent to distribute them. Distribution requires a mechanical license, such as that discussed here. In 
most cases, there is no significant question as to whether a recording made for archival purposes is 
lawful. However, in some cases the institution may have agreed contractually not to record the 
performance, possibly as part of a rental agreement that is common with orchestral music. In any such 
case where a recording was made despite that agreement, the recording might be unlawfully made, 
and in that case the compulsory license would not be available. 
 
The Sec. 115 compulsory license has one important limitation. The compulsory license applies only 
to nondramatic musical works, and there is no equivalent compulsory license for dramatic works. 
Therefore, even with the Sec. 115 license, the institution would still have to negotiate licenses to 
distribute any dramatic musical works, such as operas and musical theatre works.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize: the MMA facilitates this hypothetical project in two ways. First, it ultimately removes 
the necessity to clear rights in any pre-1972 sound recordings through the expansion of the Sec. 108(h) 
exception for libraries and archives. Second, it facilitates licensing of nondramatic musical works 
through the creation of the Blanket License for Digital Use. The MMA did not change the law’s 
treatment of copyrighted (i.e., post-1972) sound recordings, though the blanket license would allow 
licensing of the underlying nondramatic musical works. Finally, the law did not change for dramatic 
musical or non-musical works underlying either pre- or post-1972 sound recordings. The latter would 
require either direct licensing with the rights holder or, where appropriate, an exception such as fair 
use. 
 
149 17 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I). 
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Glossary of terms and acronyms 
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS): An international trade 
agreement administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The agreement requires WTO 
members to adhere to certain minimum requirements for intellectual property rights and enforcement. 
The agreement was negotiated through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and its 
provisions were codified in U.S. law by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994. 
 
Allocation for Music Producers Act (AMP Act): May refer to Title III of the Orrin Hatch–Bob 
Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018, signed into law as Pub. L. 115-264, or to its legislative 
predecessor, H.R. 881, introduced separately in 2017. 
 
AMP Act: see Allocation for Music Producers Act. 
 
BDL: see Blanket License for Digital Use 
 
Berne Convention: Formally the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
is the primary international treaty governing copyright, and administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). The treaty formalized the notion that a work under copyright in one 
country enjoys similar protection in all countries, and it dispensed with formalities (such as 
registration) as a prerequisite to protection. The Berne Convention entered into force for its first 
signatories on Dec. 5, 1887, and was last amended in 1979. The United States ratified the treaty in 
1988 and implemented it with the Berne Convention Implementation Act, effective March 1, 1989. 
 
Blanket license: In general, a contract that grants its licensee usage privileges to an entire body of 
works, rather than to a single specific work. See also: Blanket License for Digital Use. 
 
Blanket License for Digital Use (BDL): the statutory blanket license, created by the MWMA and 
codified in 17 U.S.C. 115(d), which authorizes qualifying Digital Music Providers to provide Digital 
Phonorecord Deliveries. 
 
CLASSICS Act: The predecessor of the Title II of the Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music 
Modernization Act, introduced in 2017 as H.R. 3301. CLASSICS stands for Compensating Legacy 
Artists for their Songs Service and Important Contributions to Society.  
 
Classics Protection and Access Act (CPAA): Title II of the Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music 
Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-264, which adds federal, quasi-copyright protection to pre-
1972 sound recordings.  
 
Compulsory license: A license, also known as a statutory license, that is made available by a 
governmental act and allows the licensee to make specified use of a work, contingent on payment of 
statutorily prescribed royalties. 
 
Copyrighted sound recording: A recording that either (1) was fixed on or after February 15, 1972, 
or (2) has restored copyright under Sec. 104A. 
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Copyright Clause: Also known as the “Progress Clause.” The basis for federal intellectual property 
laws in the United States, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution: 
“[Congress shall have the power] to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."  
 
Covered activity:  
– In the Musical Works Modernization Act, refers to those activities that are authorized by the 
compulsory license provided under 17 U.S.C. 115. 
– In the Classics Protection and Access Act, refers to any action to which the rights holders of 
pre-1972 sound recordings have the exclusive right to authorize. Equivalent to the exclusive 
rights provided to owners of copyrighted works in 17 U.S.C. 106. 
 
CPAA: See Classics Protection and Access Act. 
 
Digital Licensee Coordinator (DLC): the entity designated by the Register of Copyrights and 
responsible for coordinating activities of licensees. The DLC selects one nonvoting member of the 
Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC). 
 
Digital Music Provider (DMP): A person or entity who is eligible to make use of the blanket license 
created by the Musical Works Modernization Act, and who obtains such a license. To be eligible, a 
DMP must have a direct contractual (or similar) relationship with its subscribers, and the ability to 
report on revenues and usage. 
 
DPD: See Digital Phonorecord Delivery. 
 
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA): An Act of Congress, Pub. L. 104-
39, which created an exclusive right to publicly perform a copyrighted sound recording through means 
of a digital audio transmission. 
 
Digital Phonorecord Delivery (DPD): an individual delivery of a phonorecord containing a sound 
recording to an individual recipient by means of a digital transmission. DPD may include both 
reproduction/distribution and public performance, and it may be achieved through permanent or 
limited phonorecord downloads, or through interactive streams. DPDs do not include noninteractive 
streams, and apply only to phonorecords (not to motion picture or audiovisual work sounds). 17 
U.S.C. 115(e)(10). 
 
Digital Transmission: legally, a “transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog 
format.” 17 U.S.C. 101. 
 
DLC: see Digital License Coordinator. 
 
DMP: see Digital Music Provider. 
 
DPD: see Digital Phonorecord Delivery 
 
DPRA: See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act. 
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Fair use doctrine: a legal doctrine holding that certain uses of copyrighted works do not constitute 
infringement even if they involve uses that are otherwise reserved as the exclusive right of the 
copyright holder. The doctrine has been a part of U.S. common law since the 1841 decision in Folsom 
v. Marsh, and was codified in 17 U.S.C. 107 by the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 
First Sale doctrine: also called the exhaustion doctrine, holds that a copyright holder’s exclusive right 
to distribute a given copy of their work expires (or is exhausted) after the first authorized sale (or other 
permanent transfer) of that copy. The doctrine does not apply to distribution via rental, lease, lending, 
or other temporary distribution of a copy. The doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus (1908) and was codified in 17 U.S.C. 109 by the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 
Interactive: In the context of streaming and other digital delivery services, an interactive service is 
one where the user determines which works are played, or when. A non-interactive service may be 
compared to the experience of a traditional radio broadcast, where the works performed are 
determined by the broadcaster, not the user. 
 
Limited download: A digital download that is accessible to the user only for a limited period of time. 
 
Mechanical license: a specialized form of reproduction/derivative work license that allows the 
licensee to create sound recordings (originally “mechanical” reproductions in the form of piano rolls) 
of a copyrighted (normally musical) work. 
 
Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC): The entity authorized by Congress and designated by the 
Register of Copyrights (with approval from the Librarian of Congress) to manage the blanket license 
created in the Musical Works Modernization Act, and to distribute accompanying royalty payments to 
right holders. 17 U.S.C. 115(e)(18) 
 
MLC: See Music Licensing Collective. 
 
Music Modernization Act (MMA): May refer to the Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music 
Modernization Act (H.R. 1551, P.L.), which became law, or the Music Modernization Act (H.R. 4706), 
which formed the predecessor of Title I of H.R. 1551. In this document, MMA and Music 
Modernization Act refer to the passed law. 
 
Musical Works Modernization Act (MWMA): Forms Title I of the Orrin Hatch–Bob Goodlatte 
Music Modernization Act of 2018. Also sometimes referred to as the Music Licensing Modernization 
Act. 
 
Neighboring rights: see related rights. 
 
Notice of license: A notice issued by a digital music provider (DMP) and to the Mechanical Licensing 
Collective (MLC) for purposes of obtaining a Sec. 115 blanket license. 
 
Notice of Noncommercial Use (NNU): A notice filed with the U.S. Copyright Office expressing 
intent to make use of the noncommercial use provisions of Sec. 1401(c). 
 
NNU: See Notice of Noncommercial Use 
 
 62 
Phonorecord: a physical object that is embedded with or otherwise contains a sound recording, such 
as a disc, tape, or cylinder, or an electronic file containing a sound recording. The legal definition of 
phonorecord excludes any sounds that accompany motion pictures or other audiovisual works. 
 
Pre-1972 sound recording: A sound recording which was first fixed in a physical medium on or 
before February 14, 1972. 
 
Preemption: The doctrine under which a federal law may, when Congress so designates, supersede 
and replace any related state laws. The legal basis for preemption, known as the “Supremacy Clause” 
is found in Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution and states that the federal law, including any 
treaties, is “the supreme law of the land.” 
 
Public Performance: a performance of a work at “any place where a substantial number of persons 
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” Public performances 
also include transmissions to the public (i.e., a “substantial number of persons…”) whether or not the 
recipients receive the transmission in the same place or at the same time. 17 U.S.C. 101. 
 
Publication is defined in Title 17 as, “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute 
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public 
performance, or public display, constitutes publication.” 
 
Related rights: in the copyright context, related rights are intellectual property rights that in some 
countries are outside the scope of copyright due to the nature of the contribution. The contributions 
of performers, producers, and broadcasters are classified in some countries as related rights. 
 
Sovereign immunity: the traditional legal doctrine that the crown (or the government) cannot be 
sued. In the United States, the basis for sovereign immunity is contained in the eleventh amendment 
to the United States Constitution, which provides that states may not be sued without their consent, 
though the Supreme Court has held that, in some circumstances, Congress may permit lawsuits against 
the states. 
 
TEACH Act: See Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act. 
 
Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (“TEACH”) Act: Part of the 21st 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002. The law created an 
exception to the public performance right for teachers and students in distance education 
environments. The exception is found in 17 U.S.C. 101(2). 
 
Terrestrial radio: Broadcasts which are made using analog, Amplitude Modulation (AM) or 
Frequency Modulation radio bands. 
 
Transition period: The period of time following the term of protection established by the Classics 
Protection and Access Act, during which pre-1972 sound recordings continue to be subject to the 
protections in the Classics Protection and Access Act. The length of a transition period depends on 
the date of publication of the recording. (see 17 U.S.C. 1401(a)(2)(B)) 
 
TRIPS: See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. 
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URAA: See Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 
 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA): An act of Congress, passed in 1994 as Pub. L. 104-39, 
that brought the United States into compliance with the agreements of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The URAA effectively created federal copyright protection 
for foreign pre-1972 sound recordings. 
 
WCT: See WIPO Copyright Treaty 
 
WIPO: See World Intellectual Property Organization 
 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT): An international agreement, formally part of the Berne 
Convention, addressing authors rights in the digital environment. The United States ratified the treaty 
on September 14, 1999 and the treaty entered into force on March 6, 2002. As of this writing, 107 of 
the 193 WIPO member states were party to the treaty. 
 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT): An international treaty governing the 
rights of producers and performers on sound recordings. The United States ratified the treaty on 
September 14, 1999, and the treaty went into force on May 20, 2002. The USA implemented the treaty 
with the passage of the WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Implementation Act, 
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. As of this writing, 106 of the 193 WIPO 
member states were party to the treaty. 
 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): The United Nations specialized agency 
charged with administering most international agreements related to copyright, patents, trademarks, 
and other forms of intellectual property. https://www.wipo.int  
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Appendix A: Selected statutory texts 
 
• Sec. 107 
• Sec. 108 
• Sec. 301 
• Sec. 1401 
 
§107: Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that 
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include—  
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made 
upon consideration of all the above factors. 
 
 
§108: Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction by libraries and archives 
 
(a)  Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is 
not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting within 
the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, 
except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), or to distribute such copy or phonorecord, under 
the conditions specified by this section, if—  
(1)  the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of 
direct or indirect commercial advantage; 
(2)  the collections of the library or archives are  
(i)  open to the public, or  
(ii)  available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institution 
of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized field; and 
(3)  the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of copyright that appears on the 
copy or phonorecord that is reproduced under the provisions of this section, or includes a 
legend stating that the work may be protected by copyright if no such notice can be found on 
the copy or phonorecord that is reproduced under the provisions of this section. 
(b)  The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply 
to three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished work duplicated 
solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for 






research use in another library or archives of the type described by clause (2) of subsection (a), 
if—  
(1)  the copy or phonorecord reproduced is currently in the collections of the library or archives; 
and 
(2)  any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced in digital format is not otherwise distributed 
in that format and is not made available to the public in that format outside the premises of 
the library or archives. 
(c)  The right of reproduction under this section applies to three copies 
or phonorecords of a published work duplicated solely for the 
purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, 
deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format in which the 
work is stored has become obsolete, if—  
(1)  the library or archives has, after a reasonable effort, determined that an unused replacement 
cannot be obtained at a fair price; and 
(2)  any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced in digital format is not made available to the 
public in that format outside the premises of the library or archives in lawful possession of 
such copy. 
 For purposes of this subsection, a format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or device 
necessary to render perceptible a work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no 
longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace. 
(d) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply 
to a copy, made from the collection of a library or archives where the 
user makes his or her request or from that of another library or 
archives, of no more than one article or other contribution to a 
copyrighted collection or periodical issue, or to a copy or 
phonorecord of a small part of any other copyrighted work, if—  
(1)  the copy or phonorecord becomes the property of the user, and the library or archives has had 
no notice that the copy or phonorecord would be used for any purpose other than private 
study, scholarship, or research; and 
(2)  the library or archives displays prominently, at the place where orders are accepted, and 
includes on its order form, a warning of copyright in accordance with requirements that the 
Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. 
(e)  The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply 
to the entire work, or to a substantial part of it, made from the 
collection of a library or archives where the user makes his or her 
request or from that of another library or archives, if the library or 
archives has first determined, on the basis of a reasonable investigation, that a copy or 
phonorecord of the copyrighted work cannot be obtained at a fair price, if—  
(1)  the copy or phonorecord becomes the property of the user, and the library or archives has had 
no notice that the copy or phonorecord would be used for any purpose other than private 
study, scholarship, or research; and 
(2)  the library or archives displays prominently, at the place where orders are accepted, and 
includes on its order form, a warning of copyright in accordance with requirements that the 
Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. 
(f)  Nothing in this section—  
(1)  shall be construed to impose liability for copyright infringement upon a library or archives or 
its employees for the unsupervised use of reproducing equipment located on its premises: 
Preservation of 
published works 
Patron copies of 
portions of articles or 
chapters 
Patron copies of 
entire works 
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Provided, That such equipment displays a notice that the making of a copy may be subject to 
the copyright law; 
(2)  excuses a person who uses such reproducing equipment or who requests a copy or 
phonorecord under subsection (d) from liability for copyright infringement for any such act, 
or for any later use of such copy or phonorecord, if it exceeds fair use as provided by section 
107; 
(3)  shall be construed to limit the reproduction and distribution by 
lending of a limited number of copies and excerpts by a library or 
archives of an audiovisual news program, subject to clauses (1), 
(2), and (3) of subsection (a); or 
(4)  in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107, or any contractual obligations 
assumed at any time by the library or archives when it obtained a copy or phonorecord of a 
work in its collections. 
(g)  The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section extend to the isolated and unrelated 
reproduction or distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of the same material on separate 
occasions, but do not extend to cases where the library or archives, or its employee—  
(1)  is aware or has substantial reason to believe that it is engaging in the related or concerted 
reproduction or distribution of multiple copies or phonorecords of the same material, whether 
made on one occasion or over a period of time, and whether intended for aggregate use by 
one or more individuals or for separate use by the individual members of a group; or 
(2)  engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of single or multiple copies or 
phonorecords of material described in subsection (d): Provided, That nothing in this clause 
prevents a library or archives from participating in interlibrary arrangements that do not have, 
as their purpose or effect, that the library or archives receiving such copies or phonorecords 
for distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a subscription to or 
purchase of such work. 
(h)  
(1)  For purposes of this section, during the last 20 years of any term 
of copyright of a published work, a library or archives, including 
a nonprofit educational institution that functions as such, may 
reproduce, distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital 
form a copy or phonorecord of such work, or portions thereof, 
for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research, if such library or archives has first 
determined, on the basis of a reasonable investigation, that none of the conditions set forth in 
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (2) apply. 
(2)  No reproduction, distribution, display, or performance is authorized under this subsection 
if—  
(A) the work is subject to normal commercial exploitation; 
(B) a copy or phonorecord of the work can be obtained at a reasonable price; or 
(C) the copyright owner or its agent provides notice pursuant to regulations promulgated by 
the Register of Copyrights that either of the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) applies. 
(3)  The exemption provided in this subsection does not apply to any subsequent uses by users 
other than such library or archives. 
(i)  The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section do not apply to a musical work, a 
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work other than an 
audiovisual work dealing with news, except that no such limitation shall apply with respect to 
rights granted by subsections (b), (c), and (h), or with respect to pictorial or graphic works 
The AV news media 
exception 
The “last 20 years” 
exception 
(cf. Sec. 1401(f)) 
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published as illustrations, diagrams, or similar adjuncts to works of which copies are reproduced 
or distributed in accordance with subsections (d) and (e). 
 
§301: Preemption with respect to other laws 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, and in accordance with chapter 14, no sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title. With 
respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, the preemptive provisions of 
subsection (a) shall apply to activities that are commenced on and after the date of enactment of 
the Classics Protection and Access Act. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to affirm or 
negate the preemption of rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from the 
nonsubscription broadcast transmission of sound recordings under the common law or statutes 
of any State for activities that do not qualify as covered activities under chapter 14 undertaken 
during the period between the date of enactment of the Classics Protection and Access Act and 
the date on which the term of prohibition on unauthorized acts under section 1401(a)(2) expires 
for such sound recordings. Any potential preemption of rights and remedies related to such 
activities undertaken during that period shall apply in all respects as it did the day before the date 
of enactment of the Classics Protection and Access Act. 
 
§ 1401: Unauthorized use of pre-1972 sound recordings 
(a) In General.— 
(1)  Unauthorized acts.—Anyone who, on or before the last day of the 
applicable transition period under paragraph (2), and without the 
consent of the rights owner, engages in covered activity with respect 
to a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject 
to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 505 and 1203 to the same extent as an 
infringer of copyright or a person that engages in unauthorized activity under chapter 12. 
(2)  Term of prohibition.— 
(A) In general.—The prohibition under paragraph (1)— 
(i)  subject to clause (ii), shall apply to a sound recording described in that paragraph— 
(I)  through December 31 of the year that is 95 years after the year of first publication; and 
(II) for a further transition period as prescribed under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph; 
and 
(ii)  shall not apply to any sound recording after February 15, 2067. 
(B) Transition periods.— 
(i)  Pre-1923 recordings.—In the case of a sound recording first 
published before January 1, 1923, the transition period 
described in subparagraph (A)(i)(II) shall end on December 31 
of the year that is 3 years after the date of enactment of this 
section. 
(ii) 1923–1946 recordings.—In the case of a sound recording first published during the 
period beginning on January 1, 1923, and ending on December 31, 1946, the transition 
period described in subparagraph (A)(i)(II) shall end on the date that is 5 years after 
the last day of the period described in subparagraph (A)(i)(I). 
(iii) 1947–1956 recordings.—In the case of a sound recording first published during the 





period described in subparagraph (A)(i)(II) shall end on the date that is 15 years after 
the last day of the period described in subparagraph (A)(i)(I). 
(iv) Post-1956 recordings.—In the case of a sound recording fixed before February 15, 
1972, that is not described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii), the transition period described in 
subparagraph (A)(i)(II) shall end on February 15, 2067. 
(3) Rule of construction.—For the purposes of this subsection, the term “anyone” includes any 
State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality 
of a State acting in the official capacity of the officer or employee, as applicable. 
(b) Certain Authorized Transmissions and Reproductions.—A public performance by means of 
a digital audio transmission of a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, or a reproduction 
in an ephemeral phonorecord or copy of a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall, 
for purposes of subsection (a), be considered to be authorized and made with the consent of the 
rights owner if— 
(1)  the transmission or reproduction would satisfy the requirements for statutory licensing under 
section 112(e)(1) or section 114(d)(2), or would be exempt under section 114(d)(1), as the case 
may be, if the sound recording were fixed on or after February 15, 1972; and 
(2)  the transmitting entity pays the statutory royalty for the transmission or reproduction pursuant 
to the rates and terms adopted under sections 112(e) and 114(f), and complies with other 
obligations, in the same manner as required by regulations adopted by the Copyright Royalty 
Judges under sections 112(e) and 114(f) for sound recordings that are fixed on or after 
February 15, 1972, except in the case of a transmission that would be exempt under section 
114(d)(1). 
(c)  Certain Noncommercial Uses of Sound Recordings That Are Not Being Commercially 
Exploited.— 
(1)  In general.—Noncommercial use of a sound recording fixed before 
February 15, 1972, that is not being commercially exploited by or under 
the authority of the rights owner shall not violate subsection (a) if— 
(A) the person engaging in the noncommercial use, in order to 
determine whether the sound recording is being commercially exploited by or under the 
authority of the rights owner, makes a good faith, reasonable search for, but does not find, 
the sound recording— 
(i)  in the records of schedules filed in the Copyright Office as described in subsection 
(f)(5)(A); and 
(ii)  on services offering a comprehensive set of sound recordings for sale or streaming; 
(B) the person engaging in the noncommercial use files a notice identifying the sound 
recording and the nature of the use in the Copyright Office in accordance with the 
regulations issued under paragraph (3)(B); and 
(C) during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the notice described in 
subparagraph (B) is indexed into the public records of the Copyright Office, the rights 
owner of the sound recording does not, in its discretion, opt out of the noncommercial 
use by filing notice thereof in the Copyright Office in accordance with the regulations 
issued under paragraph (5). 
(2)  Rules of construction.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) merely recovering costs of production and distribution of a sound recording resulting from 
a use otherwise permitted under this subsection does not itself necessarily constitute a 
commercial use of the sound recording; 
(B)  the fact that a person engaging in the use of a sound recording also engages in commercial 
activities does not itself necessarily render the use commercial; and 
Noncommercial 
use safe harbor 
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(C) the fact that a person files notice of a noncommercial use of a sound recording in 
accordance with the regulations issued under paragraph (3)(B) does not itself affect any 
limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright owner described in section 107, 108, 109, 
110, or 112(f) as applied to a claim under subsection (a) of this section pursuant to 
subsection (f)(1)(A) of this section. 
(3)  Notice of covered activity.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
section, the Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations that— 
(A) provide specific, reasonable steps that, if taken by a filer, are sufficient to constitute a good 
faith, reasonable search under paragraph (1)(A) to determine whether a recording is being 
commercially exploited, including the services that satisfy the good faith, reasonable search 
requirement under paragraph (1)(A) for purposes of the safe harbor described in paragraph 
(4)(A); and 
(B)  establish the form, content, and procedures for the filing of notices under paragraph 
(1)(B). 
(4) Safe harbor.— 
(A) In general.—A person engaging in a noncommercial use of a sound recording otherwise 
permitted under this subsection who establishes that the person made a good faith, 
reasonable search under paragraph (1)(A) without finding commercial exploitation of the 
sound recording by or under the authority of the rights owner shall not be found to be in 
violation of subsection (a). 
(B) Steps sufficient but not necessary.—Taking the specific, reasonable steps identified by 
the Register of Copyrights in the regulations issued under paragraph (3)(A) shall be 
sufficient, but not necessary, for a filer to satisfy the requirement to conduct a good faith, 
reasonable search under paragraph (1)(A) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph. 
(5) Opting out of covered activity.— 
(A) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the 
Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations establishing the form, content, and 
procedures for the rights owner of a sound recording that is the subject of a notice under 
paragraph (1)(B) to, in its discretion, file notice opting out of the covered activity described 
in the notice under paragraph (1)(B) during the 90-day period beginning on the date on 
which the notice under paragraph (1)(B) is indexed into the public records of the Copyright 
Office. 
(B)  Rule of construction.—The fact that a rights holder opts out of a noncommercial use of 
a sound recording by filing notice thereof in the Copyright Office in accordance with the 
regulations issued under subparagraph (A) does not itself enlarge or diminish any 
limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright owner described in section 107, 108, 109, 
110, or 112(f) as applied to a claim under subsection (a) of this section pursuant to 
subsection (f)(1)(A) of this section. 
(6) Civil penalties for certain acts.— 
(A) Filing of notices of noncommercial use.—Any person who willfully engages in a 
pattern or practice of filing a notice of noncommercial use of a sound recording as 
described in paragraph (1)(B) fraudulently describing the use proposed, or knowing that 
the use proposed is not permitted under this subsection, shall be assessed a civil penalty 
in an amount that is not less than $250, and not more than $1000, for each such notice, in 
addition to any other remedies that may be available under this title based on the actual 
use made.  
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(B) Filing of opt-out notices.— 
(i)  In general.—Any person who files an opt-out notice as described in paragraph (1)(C), 
knowing that the person is not the rights owner or authorized to act on behalf of the 
rights owner of the sound recording to which the notice pertains, shall be assessed a 
civil penalty in an amount not less than $250, and not more than $1,000, for each such 
notice. 
(ii)  Pattern or practice.—Any person who engages in a pattern or practice of making 
filings as described in clause (i) shall be assessed a civil penalty in an amount not less 
than $10,000 for each such filing. 
(C) Definition.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term “knowing”— 
(i)  does not require specific intent to defraud; and 
(ii)  with respect to information about ownership of the sound recording in question, 
means that the person— 
(I) has actual knowledge of the information; 
(II)  acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or 
(III) acts in grossly negligent disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. 
(d)  Payment of Royalties for Transmissions of Performances by Direct Licensing of Statutory 
Services.— 
(1)  In general.—A public performance by means of a digital audio transmission of a sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be considered 
to be authorized and made with the consent of the rights owner if the transmission is made 
pursuant to a license agreement voluntarily negotiated at any time between the rights owner 
and the entity performing the sound recording. 
 
(2)  Payment of royalties to nonprofit collective under certain license agreements.— 
(A) Licenses entered into on or after date of enactment.—To the extent that a license 
agreement described in paragraph (1) entered into on or after the date of enactment of 
this section extends to a public performance by means of a digital audio transmission of a 
sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, that meets the conditions of subsection 
(b)— 
(i)  the licensee shall, with respect to such transmission, pay to the collective designated 
to distribute receipts from the licensing of transmissions in accordance with section 
114(f), 50 percent of the performance royalties for that transmission due under the 
license; and 
(ii)  the royalties paid under clause (i) shall be fully credited as payments due under the 
license. 
(B) Certain agreements entered into before enactment.—To the extent that a license 
agreement described in paragraph (1), entered into during the period beginning on January 
1 of the year in which this section is enacted and ending on the day before the date of 
enactment of this section, or a settlement agreement with a preexisting satellite digital 
audio radio service (as defined in section 114(j)) entered into during the period beginning 
on January 1, 2015, and ending on the day before the date of enactment of this section, 
extends to a public performance by means of a digital audio transmission of a sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, that meets the conditions of subsection (b)— 
(i)  the rights owner shall, with respect to such transmission, pay to the collective 
designated to distribute receipts from the licensing of transmissions in accordance with 
section 114(f) an amount that is equal to the difference between— 
(I)  50 percent of the difference between— 
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(aa) the rights owner’s total gross performance royalty fee receipts or settlement 
monies received for all such transmissions covered under the license or 
settlement agreement, as applicable; and 
(bb) the rights owner’s total payments for outside legal expenses, including any 
payments of third-party claims, that are directly attributable to the license or 
settlement agreement, as applicable; and 
(II) the amount of any royalty receipts or settlement monies under the agreement that 
are distributed by the rights owner to featured and nonfeatured artists before the 
date of enactment of this section; and 
(ii)  the royalties paid under clause (i) shall be fully credited as payments due under the 
license or settlement agreement, as applicable. 
(3)  Distribution of royalties and settlement monies by collective.—The collective described 
in paragraph (2) shall, in accordance with subparagraphs (B) through (D) of section 114(g)(2), 
and paragraphs (5) and (6) of section 114(g), distribute the royalties or settlement monies 
received under paragraph (2) under a license or settlement described in paragraph (2), which 
shall be the only payments to which featured and nonfeatured artists are entitled by virtue of 
the transmissions described in paragraph (2), except for settlement monies described in 
paragraph (2) that are distributed by the rights owner to featured and nonfeatured artists 
before the date of enactment of this section. 
(4) Payment of royalties under license agreements entered before enactment or not 
otherwise described in paragraph (2).— 
(A) In general.—To the extent that a license agreement described in paragraph (1) entered 
into before the date of enactment of this section, or any other license agreement not as 
described in paragraph (2), extends to a public performance by means of a digital audio 
transmission of a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, that meets the 
conditions of subsection (b), the payments made by the licensee pursuant to the license 
shall be made in accordance with the agreement. 
(B) Additional payments not required.—To the extent that a licensee has made, or will 
make in the future, payments pursuant to a license as described in subparagraph (A), the 
provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not require any additional payments from, or 
additional financial obligations on the part of, the licensee. 
(C) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prohibit the 
collective designated to distribute receipts from the licensing of transmissions in 
accordance with section 114(f) from administering royalty payments under any license not 
described in paragraph (2). 
(e)  Preemption With Respect to Certain Past Acts.— 
(1)  In general.—This section preempts any claim of common law copyright or equivalent right 
under the laws of any State arising from a digital audio transmission or reproduction that is 
made before the date of enactment of this section of a sound recording fixed before February 
15, 1972, if— 
(A) the digital audio transmission would have satisfied the requirements for statutory licensing 
under section 114(d)(2) or been exempt under section 114(d)(1), or the reproduction 
would have satisfied the requirements of section 112(e)(1), as the case may be, if the sound 
recording were fixed on or after February 15, 1972; and 
(B) either— 
(i)  except in the case of a transmission that would have been exempt under section 
114(d)(1), not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this section, the 
transmitting entity pays statutory royalties and provides notice of the use of the 
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relevant sound recordings in the same manner as required by regulations adopted by 
the Copyright Royalty Judges for sound recordings that are fixed on or after February 
15, 1972, for all the digital audio transmissions and reproductions satisfying the 
requirements for statutory licensing under sections 112(e)(1) and 114(d)(2) during the 
3 years before that date of enactment; or 
(ii)  an agreement voluntarily negotiated between the rights owner and the entity 
performing the sound recording (including a litigation settlement agreement entered 
into before the date of enactment of this section) authorizes or waives liability for any 
such transmission or reproduction and the transmitting entity has paid for and 
reported such digital audio transmission under that agreement. 
(2)  Rule of construction for common law copyright.—For purposes of paragraph (1), a claim 
of common law copyright or equivalent right under the laws of any State includes a claim that 
characterizes conduct subject to that paragraph as an unlawful distribution, act of record 
piracy, or similar violation. 
(3)  Rule of construction for public performance rights.—Nothing in this section may be 
construed to recognize or negate the existence of public performance rights in sound 
recordings under the laws of any State. 
(f) Limitations on Remedies.— 
(1) Fair use; uses by libraries, archives, and educational institutions.— 
(A) In general.—The limitations on the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner described in sections 107, 108, 109, 110, and 112(f) shall 
apply to a claim under subsection (a) with respect to a sound 
recording fixed before February 15, 1972. 
(B)  Rule of construction for section 108(h).—With respect to the 
application of section 108(h) to a claim under subsection (a) with 
respect to a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, the 
phrase “during the last 20 years of any term of copyright of a published work” in such 
section 108(h) shall be construed to mean at any time after the date of enactment of this 
section. 
(2) Actions.—The limitations on actions described in section 507 shall apply to a claim under 
subsection (a) with respect to a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972. 
(3) Material online.—Section 512 shall apply to a claim under subsection (a) with respect to a 
sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972. 
(4) Principles of equity.—Principles of equity apply to remedies for a violation of this section to 
the same extent as such principles apply to remedies for infringement of copyright. 
(5) Filing requirement for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.— 
(A) Filing of information on sound recordings.— 
(i)  Filing requirement.—Except in the case of a transmitting 
entity that has filed contact information for that transmitting 
entity under subparagraph (B), in any action under this section, 
an award of statutory damages or of attorneys’ fees under 
section 504 or 505 may be made with respect to an unauthorized 
use of a sound recording under subsection (a) only if— 
(I)  the rights owner has filed with the Copyright Office a schedule that specifies the 
title, artist, and rights owner of the sound recording and contains such other 
information, as practicable, as the Register of Copyrights prescribes by regulation; 
and 









(II) the use occurs after the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date on which 
the information described in subclause (I) is indexed into the public records of the 
Copyright Office. 
(ii)  Regulations.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, 
the Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations that— 
(I)  establish the form, content, and procedures for the filing of schedules under clause 
(i); 
(II) provide that a person may request that the person receive timely notification of a 
filing described in subclause (I); and 
(III) set forth the manner in which a person may make a request under subclause (II). 
(B) Filing of contact information for transmitting entities.— 
(i)  Filing requirement.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this 
section, the Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations establishing the form, 
content, and procedures for the filing of contact information by any entity that, as of 
the date of enactment of this section, performs a sound recording fixed before 
February 15, 1972, by means of a digital audio transmission. 
(ii)  Time limit on filings.—The Register of Copyrights may accept filings under clause 
(i) only until the 180th day after the date of enactment of this section. 
(iii) Limitation on statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.— 
(I)  Limitation.—An award of statutory damages or of attorneys’ fees under section 
504 or 505 may not be made against an entity that has filed contact information 
for that entity under clause (i) with respect to an unauthorized use by that entity 
of a sound recording under subsection (a) if the use occurs before the end of the 
90-day period beginning on the date on which the entity receives a notice that— 
(aa) is sent by or on behalf of the rights owner of the sound recording; 
(bb) states that the entity is not legally authorized to use that sound recording 
under subsection (a); and 
(cc) identifies the sound recording in a schedule conforming to the requirements 
prescribed by the regulations issued under subparagraph (A)(ii). 
(II) Undeliverable notices.—In any case in which a notice under subclause (I) is sent 
to an entity by mail or courier service and the notice is returned to the sender 
because the entity either is no longer located at the address provided in the contact 
information filed under clause (i) or has refused to accept delivery, or the notice is 
sent by electronic mail and is undeliverable, the 90-day period under subclause (I) 
shall begin on the date of the attempted delivery. 
(C) Section 412.—Section 412 shall not limit an award of statutory damages under section 
504(c) or attorneys’ fees under section 505 with respect to a covered activity in violation 
of subsection (a). 
(6) Applicability of other provisions.— 
(A) In general.—Subject to subparagraph (B), no provision of this title shall apply to or limit 
the remedies available under this section except as otherwise provided in this section. 
(B) Applicability of definitions.—Any term used in this section that is defined in section 
101 shall have the meaning given that term in section 101. 
(g)  Application of Section 230 Safe Harbor.—For purposes of section 230 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230), subsection (a) shall be considered to be a “law pertaining to 
intellectual property” under subsection (e)(2) of such section 230. 
(h) Application to Rights Owners.— 
(1) Transfers.—With respect to a rights owner described in subsection (l)(2)(B)— 
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(A) subsections (d) and (e) of section 201 and section 204 shall apply to a transfer described 
in subsection (l)(2)(B) to the same extent as with respect to a transfer of copyright 
ownership; and 
(B) notwithstanding section 411, that rights owner may institute an action with respect to a 
violation of this section to the same extent as the owner of an exclusive right under a 
copyright may institute an action under section 501(b). 
(2) Application of other provisions.—The following provisions shall apply to a rights owner 
under this section to the same extent as any copyright owner: 
(A) Section 112(e)(2). 
(B) Section 112(e)(7). 
(C) Section 114(e). 
(D) Section 114(h). 
(i)  Ephemeral Recordings.—An authorized reproduction made under this section shall be subject 
to section 112(g) to the same extent as a reproduction of a sound recording fixed on or after 
February 15, 1972. 
(j)  Rule of Construction.—A rights owner of, or featured recording artist who performs on, a sound 
recording under this chapter shall be deemed to be an interested copyright party, as defined in 
section 1001, to the same extent as a copyright owner or featured recording artist under chapter 
10. 
(k)  Treatment of States and State Instrumentalities, Officers, and 
Employees.—Any State, and any instrumentality, officer, or employee 
described in subsection (a)(3), shall be subject to the provisions of this 
section in the same manner and to the same extent as any 
nongovernmental entity. 
(l) Definitions.—In this section: 
(1)  Covered activity.—The term “covered activity” means any activity 
that the copyright owner of a sound recording would have the 
exclusive right to do or authorize under section 106 or 602, or that 
would violate section 1201 or 1202, if the sound recording were fixed 
on or after February 15, 1972. 
(2) Rights owner.—The term “rights owner” means— 
(A) the person that has the exclusive right to reproduce a sound recording under the laws of 
any State, as of the day before the date of enactment of this section; or 
(B)  any person to which a right to enforce a violation of this section may be transferred, in 
whole or in part, after the date of enactment of this section, under— 
(i)  subsections (d) and (e) of section 201; and 
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2. The law says "solely for," but the committee report states that 
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